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US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

arstechnica.com

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Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#11

Post by jevinskie »

akira2501 wrote: post #6
waster wrote: post #5

National zombie attack alert... it's only a matter of time.

EAS has so many weaknesses, I'd actually qualify this as the least worrisome. The way we deploy any computerized equipment that is a part of our air-chain includes firewalls and only allowing connections to the necessary servers for CAP type alerts. Every EAS receiver is typically monitoring other stations in the area for EAS relay. We actually have a tuner tuned to another station in the market and if we hear an EAS…

I wrote a SAME FSK encoder in Java. It was very straightforward. If I had a transmitter, I could have strolled by the local TV or radio station and caused the entire state of Indiana to declare a hurricane emergency.

Relayed across radio stations, TV ticker, and your weather radio.

Here is a bit of the specification: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Specific_Area_Message_Encoding...

Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#13

Post by rdl »

dave1010uk wrote: post #12

If you were building a system with legacy firmware (so, for examole you couldn't rotate keys in case of a breach), how would you mitigate against situations like this? Can anyone give a brief overview of how to architect a more secure system?

When you build a public key into firmware which isn't easily updated, you need to put a lot of effort into securing the corresponding private key. The correct way to do this is to have a separate credential for your actual admin users who then use that to authenticate to an HSM or similar system which controls the actual widely-deployed keys. Humans should never be able to access the important private keys directly, and there should be a logging process which shows those keys have never been exported (and have technical and policy controls against being exported) without proper multi-party control (so, you back them up in k of n shares, and distribute those shares across corporate officers in multiple sites in the event you need to replace the HSM).

Shorter lived keys and more frequent updates, provided you also have a secure way of authenticating the updates (hard) is often preferred.

Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#14

Post by bdonlan »

dave1010uk wrote: post #12

If you were building a system with legacy firmware (so, for examole you couldn't rotate keys in case of a breach), how would you mitigate against situations like this? Can anyone give a brief overview of how to architect a more secure system?

You can put the private key on a few HSMs, and have the HSM enforce a security policy (eg - access must be authorized by a quorum of operators). Never allow the private key to leave the HSM, ever again, except when initializing a new HSM (in which case, it had better be encrypted by the new HSM's unique key before leaving the old one).

Then you go fix your legacy firmware.

Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#15

Post by glabifrons »

It's sad that it was abused to broadcast a prank (that might send phobics over the edge) rather than something to enlighten those who don't frequent sites like this one about the current situation with regard to SWIFT, the NSA, and the associated dangers of the situation. Most of the people either aren't aware of it at all, or are focused on Snowden (thanks to CNN, et al) and ignoring or are otherwise oblivious of the huge problem that he exposed. Far too many don't think for themselves and believe that it's actually a good thing, that it won't/can't be abused, and that it's entirely to fight terrorism. These same people believe that terrorism is an enormous threat (bigger than being killed by drunk drivers, smoking, and bathtub drowning). Sadly, I know plenty of people that fit into this category.

Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#17

Post by D9u »

jlgreco wrote: post #9
dfc wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"The best and the brightest" is such a strange phrase. Whenever I read it I always think of Halberstam and assume the author is using the phrase pejoratively.

Yeah, I cannot help but hear that phrase sarcastically, sort of like "good enough for government work."

Outstanding

    Euphemism for "standing around outside - a lot"

Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#18

Post by pja »

jlgreco wrote: post #9
dfc wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"The best and the brightest" is such a strange phrase. Whenever I read it I always think of Halberstam and assume the author is using the phrase pejoratively.

Yeah, I cannot help but hear that phrase sarcastically, sort of like "good enough for government work."

It used to be a complement IIRC: the US government set standards which were much tighter than those which were usually acceptable in the commercial world at the time & enforced them. If your work was "good enough for government work" then you were holding yourself to a higher standard than the norm for commercial manufacturing at the time.

Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#19

Post by raverbashing »

betterunix wrote: post #2

This is why smart cards should be used. You should not be able to accidentally distribute a private key like this.

Yes

Private keys without a passphrase are probably even riskier than passwords

Private keys with a passphrase had better have a hard passphrase or they'll just be bruteforced offline

Re: US Emergency Alert System private SSH key mistakenly distributed

#20

Post by StavrosK »

jevinskie wrote: post #11
akira2501 wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

EAS has so many weaknesses, I'd actually qualify this as the least worrisome. The way we deploy any computerized equipment that is a part of our air-chain includes firewalls and only allowing connections to the necessary servers for CAP type alerts. Every EAS receiver is typically monitoring other stations in the area for EAS relay. We actually have a tuner tuned to another station in the market and if we hear an EAS…

I wrote a SAME FSK encoder in Java. It was very straightforward. If I had a transmitter, I could have strolled by the local TV or radio station and caused the entire state of Indiana to declare a hurricane emergency. Relayed across radio stations, TV ticker, and your weather radio. Here is a bit of the specification: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Specific_Area_Message_Encoding...

Clearly, there should be laws mandating that everyone who knows Java, has visited that Wikipedia page, or walks outside radio stations be surveilled at all times, to ensure people's safety.
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