Glad to see Searle's Chinese Room mentioned early on in the paper. "Syntax is not sufficient for semantics," no matter how much compute we throw at the problem. My very amateur view is that until the underlying compute architecture and substrate resembles artificial biology more than silicon, we wont get there. The latest advances in AI have given me even more appreciation of biology and evolution. It's incredible wh…
The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
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Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#121. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they're conscious because they talk like a human.
2. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they can't be conscious because humans are obviously somehow special. This appears to be the largest group, and is linked to our religiously rooted culture in which human exceptionalism is the default.
Those first two groups comprise the majority of people, and are not worth engaging with.
3. People who have thought about it, and came to the conclusion that they might be conscious, usually for computationalism/functionalism reasons. This is the group that I place myself in.
4. People who have thought about it, and came to the conclusion that they can't be conscious, usually for biological naturalist reasons. This seems to be the predominant group on Hacker News (among those who discuss it).
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#13From my observations, there are generally four camps in the machine consciousness discussion: 1. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they're conscious because they talk like a human. 2. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they can't be conscious because humans are obviously somehow special. This appears to be the largest group, and is linked to our religiously rooted culture in w…
The interesting bit to do for both cases is look at the 'they talk like a human' and 'are obviously somehow special' parts, separate the ideas of language, intelligence (memory, fluidity, abstract reasoning), _aliveness_ (as a biological process) and finally ideas about metacognition and theory of mind, and see whether their idea of consciousness as a super-bundle of the above (which is how I assume a lot of default ideas about consciousness are) actually sticks, or whether it falls apart when beings can have a subset of those properties but not all.
Also, I nominate myself to be in the 'People who have thought about it and are becoming more doubtful that I myself am conscious, and the question might be moot.' group.
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#14From my observations, there are generally four camps in the machine consciousness discussion: 1. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they're conscious because they talk like a human. 2. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they can't be conscious because humans are obviously somehow special. This appears to be the largest group, and is linked to our religiously rooted culture in w…
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#15From my observations, there are generally four camps in the machine consciousness discussion: 1. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they're conscious because they talk like a human. 2. People who haven't really thought about it, and assume they can't be conscious because humans are obviously somehow special. This appears to be the largest group, and is linked to our religiously rooted culture in w…
I'm not sure I'd agree that people in groups 1 and 2 aren't worth engaging with. The interesting bit to do for both cases is look at the 'they talk like a human' and 'are obviously somehow special' parts, separate the ideas of language, intelligence (memory, fluidity, abstract reasoning), _aliveness_ (as a biological process) and finally ideas about metacognition and theory of mind, and see whether their idea of cons…
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#16Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not sure I'd agree that people in groups 1 and 2 aren't worth engaging with. The interesting bit to do for both cases is look at the 'they talk like a human' and 'are obviously somehow special' parts, separate the ideas of language, intelligence (memory, fluidity, abstract reasoning), _aliveness_ (as a biological process) and finally ideas about metacognition and theory of mind, and see whether their idea of cons…
I'm curious about your doubting your own consciousness statement, given that "we humans are conscious" is pretty axiomic to its definition and one of the few pieces that most agree with.
If you're looking for one of the genuine angles on this:
Consciousness is horrendously under-defined, to the point some people go something like "you know, at this point I figure we'd be better off not having this word at all. "
Some days that's me, with a headache.
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#17Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm curious about your doubting your own consciousness statement, given that "we humans are conscious" is pretty axiomic to its definition and one of the few pieces that most agree with.
Take a look at Daniel Dennett, for starters! If you're looking for one of the genuine angles on this: Consciousness is horrendously under-defined, to the point some people go something like "you know, at this point I figure we'd be better off not having this word at all. " Some days that's me, with a headache.
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#18This is the complete opposite of Hofstadter's "Strange Loop" hypothesis, which intuitively makes much more sense to me.
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#19Total drivel. Consciousness in biological systems is "a given" because of metabolism?
Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate but Not Instantiate Consciousness
#20The paper makes a huge assumption that only thermodynamic constitutions can produce consciousness. The assumptions seems completely unsubstantiated given that thermodynamics are just states and states are replicable. The whole Chinese Room idea is pure sophistry as well. Both Dennett and Hofstadter address it quite well in Consciousness Explained and I am a Strange Loop respectively.