What would it take for people to stop recklessly running unconstrained AI agents on machines they actually care about? A Stanford researcher thinks the answer is a new lightweight Linux container system that you don't have to configure or think about.
Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
11–20 of 374 posts
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#12How is this different than say bubblewrap and others?
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#13What would Jonathan Blow think about this.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#14I wonder if shitty looking websites and unambitious grammar will become how we prove we are human soon.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#15 {
"sandbox": {
"enabled": true,
"filesystem": {
"allowRead": ["."],
"denyRead": ["~/"],
"allowWrite": ["."],
"denyWrite": ["/"]
}
}
}
You can change the read part if you're ok with it reading outside. This feature was only added 10 days ago fwiw but it's great and pretty much this.Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#16Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#17Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#18Claude's stock unprompted / uninspired UI code creates carbon clone components. That "jai is not a promise of perfect safety" callout box is like the em dash of FE code. The contrast, or lack thereof, makes some of the text particularly invisible. I wonder if shitty looking websites and unambitious grammar will become how we prove we are human soon.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#19Claude's stock unprompted / uninspired UI code creates carbon clone components. That "jai is not a promise of perfect safety" callout box is like the em dash of FE code. The contrast, or lack thereof, makes some of the text particularly invisible. I wonder if shitty looking websites and unambitious grammar will become how we prove we are human soon.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#20More seriously, I'm not a heavy agent user, but I just create a user account for the agent with none of my own files or ssh keys or anything like that. Hopefully that's safe enough? I guess the risk is that it figures out a local privilege escalation exploit...