This can also be done using existing Vaults or Secrets manager. Hashicorp Vault can do this and agents can be instructed to get secrets, which are set without the agent's knowledge. I use these 2 simple scripts with OpenClaw to achieve this, along with time-scoped expiration. The call to vault_get.sh is inside the agent's skill script so that the secrets are not leaked to LLMs or in any trace logs: vault_get.sh: http…
Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
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Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#12Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
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If this is of interest, I also recommend looking into: https://github.com/loderunner/scrt.
To me, it's a compliment to 1password.
I use it to save every new secret/api key I get via the CLI.
It's intentionally very feature limited.
Haven't tried it with agents, but wouldn't be surprised if the CLI (as is) would be enough.
Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#14This problem+solution, like many others in the agentic-space, have nothing agent-specific. Giving a "box" API keys was always considered a risk, and auth-proxying has existed as a solution forever. See tokenizer[0] by the fly.io team, which makes it a stateless service for eg - no database or dashboard. Or the buzzfeed SSO proxy, which lets you do the same via an OAuth2-dance at the frontend, and a upstream config at…
Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#15Why not just use AWS Secrets Manager?
What are you suggesting? The program makes a call to retrieve the secret from AWS? Then has full access to do with it what they want? That's exactly the risk and the problem this, and related solutions mentioned in this thread, is trying to solve.
Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#16This is the right approach. I built a similar system to https://github.com/airutorg/airut - couple of learnings to share: 1) Not all systems respect HTTP_PROXY. Node in particular is very uncooperative in this regard. 2) AWS access keys can’t be handled by simple credential swap; the requests need to be resigned with the real keys. Replicating the SigV4 and SigV4A exactly was bit of a pain. 3) To be secure, this syst…
I essentially run a sidecar container that sets up ip tables that redirect all requests through my mitm proxy. This was specifically required because of Node not respecting HTTP_PROXY.
Also had to inject a self signed cert to ensure SSL could be proxied and terminated by the mitm proxy, which then injects the secrets, and forwards the request on.
Have you run into any issues with this setup? I'm trying to figure out if there's anything I'm missing that might come back to bite me?
Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#17This is the right approach. I built a similar system to https://github.com/airutorg/airut - couple of learnings to share: 1) Not all systems respect HTTP_PROXY. Node in particular is very uncooperative in this regard. 2) AWS access keys can’t be handled by simple credential swap; the requests need to be resigned with the real keys. Replicating the SigV4 and SigV4A exactly was bit of a pain. 3) To be secure, this syst…
Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#18So how does that help exactly? The agent can still do exactly what it could have done if it had the real key.
Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#19IronClaw seems to do this natively, I like the idea in general, so it's good too see this pulled out. I have few questions: - How can a proxy inject stuff if it's TLS encrypted? (same for IronClaw and others) - Any adapters for existing secret stores? like maybe my fake credential can be a 1Password entry path (like 1Password:vault-name/entry/field and it would pull from 1P instead of having to have yet another place…
Re: Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
#20This is the right approach. I built a similar system to https://github.com/airutorg/airut - couple of learnings to share: 1) Not all systems respect HTTP_PROXY. Node in particular is very uncooperative in this regard. 2) AWS access keys can’t be handled by simple credential swap; the requests need to be resigned with the real keys. Replicating the SigV4 and SigV4A exactly was bit of a pain. 3) To be secure, this syst…
Im literally working on the exact same solution. Difference is I'm running the system in a Kubernetes cluster. I essentially run a sidecar container that sets up ip tables that redirect all requests through my mitm proxy. This was specifically required because of Node not respecting HTTP_PROXY. Also had to inject a self signed cert to ensure SSL could be proxied and terminated by the mitm proxy, which then injects th…
Another thing I did was to allow configuring which hosts each credential is scoped to. Replacement /resigning doesn’t happen unless host matches. That way it is not possible to leak keys by making requests to malicious hosts.