Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've always assumed the attack vector was to leave the sticks lying around. If I'm not mistaken, some people have left them at banks in hopes that the employees will plug them into one of the computers there to see what's on it. Almost everyone I know has plugged a USB stick they don't own into their computer at one point or another.
Many PCs are patched now so there's no default autorun.inf (or similar) functionality. So you'd have to run a binary on it to trigger this exploit it seems. Doable of course, but one step harder.
Introducing the USB Stick of Death
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Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#12As a security vulnerability, it's interesting but, as they stated, low-severity. If you have physical access and a local user, it's much easier to use any Linux boot CD and one of the myriad "password recovery" systems. I used Petter N Hagen's http://pogostick.net/~pnh/ntpasswd/ back in my tech support days (several years ago). The current tech support guy swears by Hiren's BootCD http://www.hiren.info/pages/bootcd
Severity isn't that low. If you hand out a USB stick to a friend and they run a .exe on it, you could surely trigger this exploit invisibly. It's probably not a broad vector attack, but surely would fit very well into a spearphishing scenario. Hand this to a less-than-savvy user and either auto-run via .inf (on older OSes) or dupe them into running some arbitrary binary to "unencrypt the volume" or something they wou…
"andrewaylett:
But it's not an autorun vulnerability, that wouldn't be newsworthy -- the problem is that simply mounting the filesystem exploits bugs in the filesystem driver."
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#13As a security vulnerability, it's interesting but, as they stated, low-severity. If you have physical access and a local user, it's much easier to use any Linux boot CD and one of the myriad "password recovery" systems. I used Petter N Hagen's http://pogostick.net/~pnh/ntpasswd/ back in my tech support days (several years ago). The current tech support guy swears by Hiren's BootCD http://www.hiren.info/pages/bootcd
Most systems that are physically available with local users (e.g. libraries, college computer labs, etc.) will have booting from anything other than the hard drive disabled, and the BIOS password protected. You'd need to open up the machine and reset the CMOS to use this approach.
"andrewaylett:
But it's not an autorun vulnerability, that wouldn't be newsworthy -- the problem is that simply mounting the filesystem exploits bugs in the filesystem driver."
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#14It's like the various autorun exploits, but better because you don't need an additional privilege escalation vulnerability and you get to execute your attack even if autorun is turned off completely.
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#15As a security vulnerability, it's interesting but, as they stated, low-severity. If you have physical access and a local user, it's much easier to use any Linux boot CD and one of the myriad "password recovery" systems. I used Petter N Hagen's http://pogostick.net/~pnh/ntpasswd/ back in my tech support days (several years ago). The current tech support guy swears by Hiren's BootCD http://www.hiren.info/pages/bootcd
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#16Earlier quoted context omitted.
Severity isn't that low. If you hand out a USB stick to a friend and they run a .exe on it, you could surely trigger this exploit invisibly. It's probably not a broad vector attack, but surely would fit very well into a spearphishing scenario. Hand this to a less-than-savvy user and either auto-run via .inf (on older OSes) or dupe them into running some arbitrary binary to "unencrypt the volume" or something they wou…
Buddy, did you even read the article before commenting?? "andrewaylett: But it's not an autorun vulnerability, that wouldn't be newsworthy -- the problem is that simply mounting the filesystem exploits bugs in the filesystem driver."
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#17As a security vulnerability, it's interesting but, as they stated, low-severity. If you have physical access and a local user, it's much easier to use any Linux boot CD and one of the myriad "password recovery" systems. I used Petter N Hagen's http://pogostick.net/~pnh/ntpasswd/ back in my tech support days (several years ago). The current tech support guy swears by Hiren's BootCD http://www.hiren.info/pages/bootcd
Nowerdays there are viruses that spread by USB memory stick - and lie dormant on the computer infecting every USB memory stick that gets plugged in. Needless to say, lecture hall computers quickly became infected - even without any malicious intent on the part of the physically present user.
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#18I really don't agree with the severity rating. Instant admin-access by just plugging in a USB stick is exactly what malware like the ever-loved Stuxnet use(d) as a jump-start to get their other exploits and backdoors going. It's like the various autorun exploits, but better because you don't need an additional privilege escalation vulnerability and you get to execute your attack even if autorun is turned off complete…
Being able to compromise a system via a mundane and apparently benign action is never low-severity.
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#19Earlier quoted context omitted.
Buddy, did you even read the article before commenting?? "andrewaylett: But it's not an autorun vulnerability, that wouldn't be newsworthy -- the problem is that simply mounting the filesystem exploits bugs in the filesystem driver."
Understood, but to fully _exploit_ the vulnerability one would need to actually execute more code than just triggering the vulnerability presumably.
To "trigger" the vulnerability is to deliver your exploit code. This USB stick can be inserted into any Windows 7 system and, voila you have your rootkit on that machine, without any user interaction required. No running of .exe files anywhere. You could put some pictures on the usb drive for the user to look at while his system is compromised. (Rootkitted is that a word? Backdoored is.)
Re: Introducing the USB Stick of Death
#20Earlier quoted context omitted.
Understood, but to fully _exploit_ the vulnerability one would need to actually execute more code than just triggering the vulnerability presumably.
You appear to not understand the concepts you are attempting to participate in a discussion about. To "trigger" the vulnerability is to deliver your exploit code. This USB stick can be inserted into any Windows 7 system and, voila you have your rootkit on that machine, without any user interaction required. No running of .exe files anywhere. You could put some pictures on the usb drive for the user to look at while h…
Social engineering only gets you both if you can autorun the executable upon insertion of the usb stick.