Earlier quoted context omitted.
> For one it had to originate from app.opencode.com No, that was the initial mitigation ! Before the vulnerability was reported, the server was accessible to the entire world with a wide-open CORS policy. https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode/commit/7d2d87fa2c44e32...
How is it wide open? Does everything go through a localhost proxy?
All your OpenCodes belong to us
11–16 of 16 posts
Re: All your OpenCodes belong to us
#12If they were designing these infrastructure pieces primarily for consumer use, they would have used named pipes, Unix domain sockets, or some other local-only IPC method instead of TCP/IP.
Re: All your OpenCodes belong to us
#13Re: All your OpenCodes belong to us
#14The one thing here confusing to me is the past tense used throughout. This CVE seems presented as both past and present, yet the present evidence isn't... Presented.
* Not running the server by default * Patched the wide open CORS policy which left the server open to execution by any page you visited.
The server is still there but you have to explicitly enable it via `opencode serve`
The original disclosure has a table of fixes that have landed: https://cy.md/opencode-rce/
Re: All your OpenCodes belong to us
#15> a RCE vulnerability is the type of thing that nation state actors in Russia and North Korea dream of Does this mean other state actors are beyond needs of RCE vulns as their tools belt and North Korea and Russia lagging behind? Some other interpretation from security-involved practitioners here - like, I don't know - we already have Pegasus, phew on OpenCode RCE?
No, from experience, any nation state actor would love to take advantage of a RCE vuln: this was painted from the perspective of Bottlerocket which is in use by DoD, NSA, etc.