Earlier quoted context omitted.
There's a section in this post with proposed replacements: https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/#th... I was also frustrated with this criticism in the past, but there are definitely some concrete alternatives provided for many use cases there. (But not just with one tool.)
I’m still frustrated by the criticism because I internalized it a couple of years ago and tried to move to age+minisig because those are the only 2 scenarios I personally care about. The overall experience was annoying given that the problems with pgp/gpg are esoteric and abstract that unless I’m personally are worried about a targeted attack against me, they are fine-ish. If someone scotch tapes age+minisig and conv…
The PGP problem (2019)
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Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#12Earlier quoted context omitted.
I’m still frustrated by the criticism because I internalized it a couple of years ago and tried to move to age+minisig because those are the only 2 scenarios I personally care about. The overall experience was annoying given that the problems with pgp/gpg are esoteric and abstract that unless I’m personally are worried about a targeted attack against me, they are fine-ish. If someone scotch tapes age+minisig and conv…
> the fact that this post is recommending Tarsnap and magicwormhole shows how badly it has aged in 6 years What's wrong with magic wormhole?
Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#13The biggest issue with PGP/gpg is the difficulty of getting rid of it. If you work on big distros, or know someone who works on big distros, please (start asking them to) add https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign to pre-installed packages to facilitate transition. It's almost a chicken egg problem but the sad thing is, no project wants to swap the signing tool to a better one until everyone can verify the new signatur…
Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#14The biggest issue with PGP/gpg is the difficulty of getting rid of it. If you work on big distros, or know someone who works on big distros, please (start asking them to) add https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign to pre-installed packages to facilitate transition. It's almost a chicken egg problem but the sad thing is, no project wants to swap the signing tool to a better one until everyone can verify the new signatur…
Note that minisign was also vulnerable in the gpg.fail exposures
Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#15Probably resurfacing, because we have some new attacks thanks to CCC. [0] [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46453461
Worth noting: minisign and age were also affected by a couple things here. GnuPG has decided a couple things are out of scope, fixed a couple others. Not all is in distro packages yet. age didn't have the clearest way to report things - discord is apparently the point of contact. Which will probably improve soon. minisign was affected by most everything GnuPG was, but had a faster turnaround to patching.
Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#16How does this help people who are not following this issue regularly? gpg protected Snowden, and this article promotes tools by one of the cryptographers who promoted non-hybrid encryption: https://blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-weakened.html#agreement So what to do? PGP by the way never claimed to prevent traffic analysis, mixmaster was the layer that somehow got dropped, unlike Tor.
Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#17Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#18How does this help people who are not following this issue regularly? gpg protected Snowden, and this article promotes tools by one of the cryptographers who promoted non-hybrid encryption: https://blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-weakened.html#agreement So what to do? PGP by the way never claimed to prevent traffic analysis, mixmaster was the layer that somehow got dropped, unlike Tor.
Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#19Neither of them supports hardware keys though, as much as I could see. OTOH ssh and GnuPG do support hardware keys, like smart cards or Yubikey-like devices. I suppose by the same token (not a pun, sadly) they don't support various software keychains provided by OSes, since they don't support any external PKCS11 providers (the way ssh does).
This may reduce the attack needed to steal a private key to a simple unprivileged infiltration, e.g. via code run during installation of a compromised npm package, or similar.
Re: The PGP problem (2019)
#20Is anyone else unable to read the report on mobile? Completely broken styling for me.