11–20 of 116 posts
Right now the problem is what the author already mentions - the use of Sec-Fetch-Site (FYI, HTTP headers are case insensitive :) - is considered defense in depth in OWASP right now, not a primary protection. Unfortunately OWASP rules the world. Not because it's the best way to protect your apps, but because the corporate overloads in infosec teams need to check the box with "Complies with OWASP Top 10"
If you want, “SameSite=Strict” may also be helpful and is supported on “all” browsers so it is reasonable to use it (but like you did, adding server validation is always a +). https://caniuse.com/mdn-http_headers_set-cookie_samesite_str... This checks Scheme, Port and Origin to decide whether the request should be allowed or not.
If you want, “SameSite=Strict” may also be helpful and is supported on “all” browsers so it is reasonable to use it (but like you did, adding server validation is always a +). https://caniuse.com/mdn-http_headers_set-cookie_samesite_str... This checks Scheme, Port and Origin to decide whether the request should be allowed or not.
I find that cookie setting really confusing. It means that cookies will only be respected on requests that originated on the site that set them... but that includes when you click links from one site to another. So if you follow a link (e.g. from a Google search) to a site that uses SameSite=Strict cookies you will be treated as logged out on the first page that you see! You won't see your logged in state until you r…
Are there any approaches to csrf tokens that don't require storing issued tokens on server-side?
CSRF is about arbitrary clicks in emails and such that automagic your logged-in-session cookies to the server. If you require an extra field and compare it, you’re fine
Am I missing something? The suggested protection helps with XSS flavors of CSRF but not crafted payloads that come from scripts which have freedom to fake all headers. At that point you also need an oauth/jwt type cookie passed over a private channel (TLS) to trust the input. Which is true for any sane web app, but still…
Am I missing something? The suggested protection helps with XSS flavors of CSRF but not crafted payloads that come from scripts which have freedom to fake all headers. At that point you also need an oauth/jwt type cookie passed over a private channel (TLS) to trust the input. Which is true for any sane web app, but still…
Am I missing something? The suggested protection helps with XSS flavors of CSRF but not crafted payloads that come from scripts which have freedom to fake all headers. At that point you also need an oauth/jwt type cookie passed over a private channel (TLS) to trust the input. Which is true for any sane web app, but still…
If an attacker has a user's private authentication token, usually stored in a __Host prefixed cookie, then it's game over anyway. CSRF is about protecting other sites forcing a user to make a request to a site they're authenticated to, when the malicious site doesn't actually have the cookie/token. CSRF is when you don't have the authentication token, but can force a user to make a request of your choosing that inclu…
That would be a terrible idea IMO. The insecurity was fundamentally introduced by cookies, which were always a hack. Those should be omitted, and then authorization methods should be designed to learn the lessons from the 70s and 80s, as CSRF is just the latest incarnation of the Confused Deputy:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46321651
e.g. serve .svg only when "Sec-Fetch-Dest: image" header is present. This will stop scripts
I'm surprised there's no mention of the SameSite cookie attribute, I'd consider that to be the modern CSRF protection and it's easy, just a cookie flag: https://scotthelme.co.uk/csrf-is-dead/ But I didn't know about the Sec-Fetch-Site header, good to know.
Are there any approaches to csrf tokens that don't require storing issued tokens on server-side?