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Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

blog.torproject.org

11–20 of 34 posts

Re: Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

#11
post #6

hey guys, anyone believes Tor still can provide anonymity to users ? just trying to ask politely.

This FUD comes up whenever Tor is mentioned on Hacker News. The answer is: let's say you think Tor isn't 100% flawless. What are you going to do? Not use Tor? It's better than any other option.

Re: Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

#13
post #6

hey guys, anyone believes Tor still can provide anonymity to users ? just trying to ask politely.

broadly yes, but the real question is: what's your threat model? https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/threat-model

I mean definitely state level actor, for example, let's say you can access all data centers in EU as most tor nodes are located in EU.

Re: Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

#14
post #6

hey guys, anyone believes Tor still can provide anonymity to users ? just trying to ask politely.

This FUD comes up whenever Tor is mentioned on Hacker News. The answer is: let's say you think Tor isn't 100% flawless. What are you going to do? Not use Tor? It's better than any other option.

What you'd do is that you'd write a distributed remailer where fixed-size messages are sent on fixed timeslots, possibly with some noise in when it's transmitted, with a message always being sent on its timeslot, even if a dummy message must be sent.

I've been writing a system like this in Erlang, intended to be short enough that you can take a picture of the source code and then type it in by hand in a reasonable amount of time, as a sort of protest against Chat Control. I'm not sure I'm going to release it-- after all, they haven't passed it yet, and there are all sorts of problems that this thing could needlessly accelerate, but I've started fiddling with it more intensively recently.

Re: Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

#15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This FUD comes up whenever Tor is mentioned on Hacker News. The answer is: let's say you think Tor isn't 100% flawless. What are you going to do? Not use Tor? It's better than any other option.

What you'd do is that you'd write a distributed remailer where fixed-size messages are sent on fixed timeslots, possibly with some noise in when it's transmitted, with a message always being sent on its timeslot, even if a dummy message must be sent. I've been writing a system like this in Erlang, intended to be short enough that you can take a picture of the source code and then type it in by hand in a reasonable am…

Don’t things like Freenet do similar?

Except that every user is also a node, thereby mixing their personal traffic into a share of network traffic. Or so I understand it.

Re: Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

#16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What you'd do is that you'd write a distributed remailer where fixed-size messages are sent on fixed timeslots, possibly with some noise in when it's transmitted, with a message always being sent on its timeslot, even if a dummy message must be sent. I've been writing a system like this in Erlang, intended to be short enough that you can take a picture of the source code and then type it in by hand in a reasonable am…

Don’t things like Freenet do similar? Except that every user is also a node, thereby mixing their personal traffic into a share of network traffic. Or so I understand it.

I'm not sure. Freenet actually stores information, this is pure communication system. I don't think it uses dummy messages.

My target size is also <500 lines, and I think <200 is feasible, whereas Freenet is apparently 192,000 lines.

Re: Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

#18
post #10
post #2

Cool! Congrats! Awesome work. Small typo: “observing predicatable changes“

I think you’re getting downvoted because you’re reporting the typo in an odd and likely unproductive place. I’m not sure what you expect HN readers to do about the typo. There is a comment section on the blog itself :)

It's not unusual that the author (or someone of the team) see the trafic peak an appears in HN to reply the questions.

Re: Counter Galois Onion: Improved encryption for Tor circuit traffic

#20
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you’re getting downvoted because you’re reporting the typo in an odd and likely unproductive place. I’m not sure what you expect HN readers to do about the typo. There is a comment section on the blog itself :)

It's not unusual that the author (or someone of the team) see the trafic peak an appears in HN to reply the questions.

Sure, that happens.

But instead of just reporting it directly, we instead get this unsubstantive comment (“Cool! Great! Btw you spelled a word wrong.”). Essentially just noise, nothing that provokes curiosity or interesting discussion.

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