11–20 of 39 posts
I don't know what problem this solves.
While I could possibly read all this and deduce what it's for, I probably won't... (the stated premise of this, "It is as true today as it was in 2011 that Javascript cryptography is Considered Harmful." is not true.)
It would be helpful if they included a problem statement of some sort. I don't know what problem this solves. While I could possibly read all this and deduce what it's for, I probably won't... (the stated premise of this, "It is as true today as it was in 2011 that Javascript cryptography is Considered Harmful." is not true.)
The classic problem with E2EE messaging on the web is that the point of E2EE is that you don't have to trust the server not to read your messages, but if you're using a web client you have to trust the server to serve you JS that won't just send the plain text of your messages to the admin.
The properties of the web really exacerbate this problem, as you can serve every visitor to your site a different version of the app based on their IP, geolocation, tracking cookies, whatever. (Whereas with a mobile app everyone gets the same version you submitted to the app store).
With this proposed system, we could actually have really trustworthy E2EE messaging apps on the web, which would be huge.
(BTW, I do think E2EE web apps still have their place currently, if you trust the server to not be malicious (say, you or a trusted friend runs it), and you're protecting from accidental disclosure)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're right that, when your own server is trustworthy, fully self-hosting removes the need for SRI and integrity manifests. But in the case that your server is compromised, you lose all guarantees. Transparency adds a mechanism to detect when your server has been compromised. Basically you just run a monitor on your own device occasionally (or use a third party service if you like), and you get an email notif whenev…
If they want to make a proposal, they should have httpc://sha-256;... URLS which are essentially constant ones, same as SRI but for top-level domains. Then we can really have security on the Web! Audit companies (even anonymous ones but with a good reputation) could vet certain hashes as being secure, and people and organizations could see a little padlock when M of N approved a new version. As it is, we need an exte…
As a site owner, the best thing you can do for your users is to serve all your resources from a server you control. Serving javascript (or any resource) from a CDN was never a great idea and is pointless these days with browser domain isolation, you might as well just copy any third party .js in your build process. I wrote a coincidently related rant post last week that didn't set the front page of HN on fire so I wo…
It would be helpful if they included a problem statement of some sort. I don't know what problem this solves. While I could possibly read all this and deduce what it's for, I probably won't... (the stated premise of this, "It is as true today as it was in 2011 that Javascript cryptography is Considered Harmful." is not true.)
For me, the key problem being solved here is to have reasonably trustworthy web implementations of end-to-end-encrypted (E2EE) messaging. The classic problem with E2EE messaging on the web is that the point of E2EE is that you don't have to trust the server not to read your messages, but if you're using a web client you have to trust the server to serve you JS that won't just send the plain text of your messages to t…
Perhaps there's something here that affects that dynamic, but I don't know what it is. It would help this effort to point out what that is.
It would be helpful if they included a problem statement of some sort. I don't know what problem this solves. While I could possibly read all this and deduce what it's for, I probably won't... (the stated premise of this, "It is as true today as it was in 2011 that Javascript cryptography is Considered Harmful." is not true.)
This allows you to validate that "what you sent is what they got", meaning that the code and assets the user's browser executes are exactly what you intended to publish.
So, this gives web apps and PWAs some of the same guarantees of native app stores, making them more trustworthy for security-sensitive use cases.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
For me, the key problem being solved here is to have reasonably trustworthy web implementations of end-to-end-encrypted (E2EE) messaging. The classic problem with E2EE messaging on the web is that the point of E2EE is that you don't have to trust the server not to read your messages, but if you're using a web client you have to trust the server to serve you JS that won't just send the plain text of your messages to t…
It doesn't seem like there's much difference in the trust model between E2EE web apps and App Store apps. Either way the publisher controls the code and you essentially decide whether to trust the publisher or not. Perhaps there's something here that affects that dynamic, but I don't know what it is. It would help this effort to point out what that is.
This proposal aims at providing the same guarantees for web apps, without resorting to signed packages on the web (ie. not the same mechanism that FirefoxOS or ChromeOS apps used). It's competing with the IWA proposal from Google, which is a good thing.
It would be helpful if they included a problem statement of some sort. I don't know what problem this solves. While I could possibly read all this and deduce what it's for, I probably won't... (the stated premise of this, "It is as true today as it was in 2011 that Javascript cryptography is Considered Harmful." is not true.)
For me, the key problem being solved here is to have reasonably trustworthy web implementations of end-to-end-encrypted (E2EE) messaging. The classic problem with E2EE messaging on the web is that the point of E2EE is that you don't have to trust the server not to read your messages, but if you're using a web client you have to trust the server to serve you JS that won't just send the plain text of your messages to t…
> One problem that WAICT doesn’t solve is that of provenance: where did the code the user is running come from, precisely?
> ...
> The folks at the Freedom of Press Foundation (FPF) have built a solution to this, called WEBCAT. ... Users with the WEBCAT plugin can...
A plugin. Sigh.
Fancy, deep transparency logs that track every asset bundle deployed are good. I like logging - this is very cool. But this is not the first thing we need.
The first thing we need, is to be able to host a public signing key somewhere that browsers can get and automatically signature verify the root hash served up in that integrity manifest. Then point a tiny boring transparency log at _that_. That's the thing I really, really care about for non-equivocation. That's the piece that lets me host my site on Cloudflare pages (or Vercel, or Fly.io, or Joe's Quick and Dirty Hosting) that ensures the software being run in my client's browser is the software I signed.
This is the pivotal thing. It needs to live in the browser. We can't leave this to a plugin.