Earlier quoted context omitted.
> But the Cantor vision of the real numbers is just wrong and completely unphysical. They're unphysical, and yet the very physical human mind can work with them just fine. They're a perfectly logical construction from perfectly reasonable axioms. There are lots of objects in math which aren't physically realizable. Plato would have said that those sorts of objects are more real than anything which actually exists in…
There are two things being talked about here, and worth teasing them out. On the one hand, this article is talking about the hierarchy of "physicality" of various mathematical concepts, and they put Cantor's real numbers at the floor. I disagree with that specifically; two quantities are interestingly "unequal" only at the precision where an underlying process can distinguish them. Turing tells us that any underlying…
it leads to the idea that measuring 2 sets via a bijection is a better idea than measuring via containment