11–20 of 244 posts
> After responsibly disclosing this critical vulnerability to the CodeRabbit team, we learned from them that they had an isolation mechanism in place, but Rubocop somehow was not running inside it. Curious what this (isolation mechanism) means if anyone knows.
(likely asked AI to implement x and ai completely disregarded the need to sandbox).
> After responsibly disclosing this critical vulnerability to the CodeRabbit team, we learned from them that they had an isolation mechanism in place, but Rubocop somehow was not running inside it. Curious what this (isolation mechanism) means if anyone knows.
> Curious what this (isolation mechanism) means if anyone knows. If they're anything like the typical web-startup "developing fast but failing faster", they probably are using docker containers for "security isolation".
I did not understand something: why did CodeRabbit run external tools on external code within its own set of environment variables? Why are these variables needed for this entire tooling?
Their own tools would need the various API keys, of course, and they did build a method to filter out those variables and managed most user code through it, but it sounds like they forgot to put Rubocop through the special method. So this researcher may have gotten lucky in choosing to dig into the tool that CodeRabbit got unlucky in forgetting.
I did not understand something: why did CodeRabbit run external tools on external code within its own set of environment variables? Why are these variables needed for this entire tooling?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Their own tools would need the various API keys, of course, and they did build a method to filter out those variables and managed most user code through it, but it sounds like they forgot to put Rubocop through the special method. So this researcher may have gotten lucky in choosing to dig into the tool that CodeRabbit got unlucky in forgetting.
It sounds like a pretty bad approach in general to have to "filter out the bad stuff" on a case-by-case basis. It should be as simple as launching everything from a sanitized parent environment, and making it impossible to launch any tool otherwise. Or better, make that sanitized environment the default and make privileged operations be the thing that jumps through hoops to talk to a bastion/enclave/whatever that hol…
> While running the exploit, CodeRabbit would still review our pull request and post a comment on the GitHub PR saying that it detected a critical security risk, yet the application would happily execute our code because it wouldn’t understand that this was actually running on their production system. What a bizarre world we're living in, where computers can talk about how they're being hacked while it's happening. A…
Why does CodeRabbit need write access to the git repo? Why doesn't Github let me limit it's access?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Their own tools would need the various API keys, of course, and they did build a method to filter out those variables and managed most user code through it, but it sounds like they forgot to put Rubocop through the special method. So this researcher may have gotten lucky in choosing to dig into the tool that CodeRabbit got unlucky in forgetting.
It sounds like a pretty bad approach in general to have to "filter out the bad stuff" on a case-by-case basis. It should be as simple as launching everything from a sanitized parent environment, and making it impossible to launch any tool otherwise. Or better, make that sanitized environment the default and make privileged operations be the thing that jumps through hoops to talk to a bastion/enclave/whatever that hol…
The only other safety I can think of is a whitelist, perhaps of file pathnames. This helps to maintain a safe-by-default posture. Taking it further, the whitelist could be specified in config and require change approval from a second team.