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Leeks and Leaks

daniel.haxx.se

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Re: Leeks and Leaks

#11

Post by 0points »

amiga386 wrote: post #9

I feel the new oniux command is doing both the right thing and the wrong thing: - right thing: catch every network access and redirect to Tor - wrong thing: create the user expectation that (if you remember to prepend "oniux") it'll catch every network access and redirect to Tor It is essentially moral hazard. What happens when you accidentally forget "oniux"? Or think you've booted up a Tails environment but it's no…

oniux is completely new to me, but this is not at all a new idea.

torsocks has been available doing the same thing since 2008.

Re: Leeks and Leaks

#13

Post by loa_in_ »

geocar wrote: post #7
Joker_vD wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> redirect certain applications over Tor, like a web browser I personally use a proxy.pac file (which all both Firefox/Chrome support) with roughly the following contents: function FindProxyForURL(url, host) { var httpProxy = "PROXY localhost:3128"; var onionProxy = "SOCKS5 localhost:9050"; if (host.endsWith(".onion")) { return onionProxy; } var proxiedDomains = [ "example.com", ... ]; for (var proxied of proxiedDoma…

Take care with this. Some people are putting sneaky code in that detects if your regular non-proxied access will receive some other network path via a .onion domain. It is not clear to me what exactly they are doing with this knowledge.

That's anecdotal or is there something to confirm this?

Re: Leeks and Leaks

#14

Post by fucker42069 »

amiga386 wrote: post #9

I feel the new oniux command is doing both the right thing and the wrong thing: - right thing: catch every network access and redirect to Tor - wrong thing: create the user expectation that (if you remember to prepend "oniux") it'll catch every network access and redirect to Tor It is essentially moral hazard. What happens when you accidentally forget "oniux"? Or think you've booted up a Tails environment but it's no…

[dead]

Re: Leeks and Leaks

#15

Post by iaaan »

loa_in_ wrote: post #13
geocar wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Take care with this. Some people are putting sneaky code in that detects if your regular non-proxied access will receive some other network path via a .onion domain. It is not clear to me what exactly they are doing with this knowledge.

That's anecdotal or is there something to confirm this?

Not the person you replied to, but theoretically, it's easy for me to imagine how that would work, so I'd definitely be wary of using a solution like this.

Re: Leeks and Leaks

#17

Post by Ey7NFZ3P0nzAe »

amiga386 wrote: post #9

I feel the new oniux command is doing both the right thing and the wrong thing: - right thing: catch every network access and redirect to Tor - wrong thing: create the user expectation that (if you remember to prepend "oniux") it'll catch every network access and redirect to Tor It is essentially moral hazard. What happens when you accidentally forget "oniux"? Or think you've booted up a Tails environment but it's no…

Had not heard about oniux:

https://blog.torproject.org/introducing-oniux-tor-isolation-...

Re: Leeks and Leaks

#18

Post by geocar »

loa_in_ wrote: post #13
geocar wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Take care with this. Some people are putting sneaky code in that detects if your regular non-proxied access will receive some other network path via a .onion domain. It is not clear to me what exactly they are doing with this knowledge.

That's anecdotal or is there something to confirm this?

Hi. I checked your profile and it says you like to be referred to as a "black hat hacker" who is being "pursued by multiple agencies".

Can you explain exactly what you hope to do with this knowledge?

Or is it not obvious when pointed out to you that you would have a different IP address accessing a .onion address and a .com address at roughly the same time?

Re: Leeks and Leaks

#19

Post by nytpu »

knome wrote: post #4

if they're going to be arbitrarily against env vars, like CURL_HOME, CURL_SSL_BACKEND, CURL_CA_BUNDLE, or the other dozen-ish variables curl already checks, an option in could .curlrc seem reasonable. of course, having a CURL_ALLOW_ONION would allow the oniux program to set it, which would very easy and straight forward for both sides. alternately, oniux could itself run a proxy and set the appropriate proxying envir…

Almost like those existing env vars made it clear that they were mistakes that make behavior inconsistent (especially libcurl) and they want to avoid repeating it with additional env vars. Having almost contributed to Curl before, they repeatedly note for contributors that just because old code does something questionable doesn't mean your new code is allowed to do it—if anything, you're just highlighting the questionable piece of old code as being important for them to rewrite soon (of course they can't remove the current env vars for compatibility reasons).

And the article specifically notes that the current solution doesn't work, but it requires discussion on what the best solution is instead of just taking the literal first solution suggested by someone.

Re: Leeks and Leaks

#20

Post by irelephant »

0points wrote: post #11
amiga386 wrote: post #9

I feel the new oniux command is doing both the right thing and the wrong thing: - right thing: catch every network access and redirect to Tor - wrong thing: create the user expectation that (if you remember to prepend "oniux") it'll catch every network access and redirect to Tor It is essentially moral hazard. What happens when you accidentally forget "oniux"? Or think you've booted up a Tails environment but it's no…

oniux is completely new to me, but this is not at all a new idea. torsocks has been available doing the same thing since 2008.

I'd say its advantage is being made officially by tor.
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