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Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

serd.es

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Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#11
There are 48+2 port switches with OpenWRT support.

Re: initial specs for the (4 port) OpenWRT One, which is built on Banana Pi's, which supports U-boot: https://www.cnx-software.com/2024/01/12/openwrt-one-ap-24-xy... .. https://openwrt.org/toh/openwrt/one:

> The non-open-source components include the 2.5GbE PHY and WiFi firmware with blobs running on separate cores that are independent of the main SoC where OpenWrt is running. The DRAM calibration routines are closed-source binaries as well.

Software for FPGA switch, probe, and GHz oscilloscope projects?

/? inurl:awesome vivado https://www.google.com/search?q=inurl%3Aawesome+vivado :

awesome-hdl: https://github.com/drom/awesome-hdl :

sphinx-hwt:

d3-wave probably won't do GHz in realtime. https://github.com/Nic30/d3-wave

Pyqtgraph probably can't realtime plot GHz probe data without resampling either?

pyqtgraph: https://github.com/pyqtgraph/pyqtgraph

The hwtLib README says Vivado supports IP-XACT format.

hwtLib: https://github.com/Nic30/hwtLib :

> hwtLib is the library of hardware components writen using hwt library. Any component can be exported as Xilinx Vivado (IP-exact) or Quartus IPcore using IpPackager or as raw Verilog / VHDL / SystemC code and constraints by to_rtl() function. Target language is specified by keyword parameter serializer.

IP-XACT: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP-XACT

hwtlib docs > hwtLib.peripheral.ethernet package: https://hwtlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/hwtLib.peripheral.et...

hwtLib.peripheral.uart package: https://hwtlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/hwtLib.peripheral.ua...

It looks like there are CRC implementations in hwtlib. Which CRC or hash does U-boot use for firmware flashing? https://www.google.com/search?q=Which+CRC+or+hash+does+U-boo... ... Looks like CRC32 like .zip files but not .tar.gz files.

U-boot: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot

OpenWRT docs > "Failsafe mode, factory reset, and recovery mode": https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/troubleshooting/failsafe...

Open vSwitch: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_vSwitch :

> Open vSwitch can operate both as a software-based network switch running within a virtual machine (VM) hypervisor, and as the control stack for dedicated switching hardware; as a result, it has been ported to multiple virtualization platforms, switching chipsets, and networking hardware accelerators.[7]

"Porting Open vSwitch to New Software or Hardware": https://docs.openvswitch.org/en/latest/topics/porting/

awesome-open-source-hardware: https://github.com/aolofsson/awesome-opensource-hardware

awesome-open-hardware: https://github.com/delftopenhardware/awesome-open-hardware :

> Journal of Open Hardware (JOH), HardwareX Journal,

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#12
"I was tipped off by a friend to a batch of Kintex UltraScale+’s, specifically the XCKU5P, on AliExpress for a mere $55 each. He had tested one from the seller and they appeared to be legitimate, although likely salvaged/reballed from some scrapped equipment."

Must be nice to know enough to be sure that your sketchy hardware isn't backdoored. I cannot imagine buying random network hardware from a sketchy source. Though I'm sure that if I had the author's chops, I wouldn't be too worried.

More broadly, network hardware is where the keyest vulnerabilities are. Open source network hardware is interesting from that perspective. You do not want random bad actor open source contributors adding backdoors.

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#13
post #12

"I was tipped off by a friend to a batch of Kintex UltraScale+’s, specifically the XCKU5P, on AliExpress for a mere $55 each. He had tested one from the seller and they appeared to be legitimate, although likely salvaged/reballed from some scrapped equipment." Must be nice to know enough to be sure that your sketchy hardware isn't backdoored. I cannot imagine buying random network hardware from a sketchy source. Thou…

In this space, it's the closed source firmware blobs that nobody can inspect that I'd be a lot more worried about.

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#14
post #13
post #12

"I was tipped off by a friend to a batch of Kintex UltraScale+’s, specifically the XCKU5P, on AliExpress for a mere $55 each. He had tested one from the seller and they appeared to be legitimate, although likely salvaged/reballed from some scrapped equipment." Must be nice to know enough to be sure that your sketchy hardware isn't backdoored. I cannot imagine buying random network hardware from a sketchy source. Thou…

In this space, it's the closed source firmware blobs that nobody can inspect that I'd be a lot more worried about.

There are no blobs I'm aware of anywhere that are actually running in the system.

The STM32s have a small boot "ROM" burned into a write-protected region of flash but I have it jumpered so I boot from main user flash, not the bootloader.

I did a quick silicon overview of them (just out of curiosity... they came new from Digikey so I have no reason to believe they're fishy).

STM32H735: top metal only https://siliconpr0n.org/map/st/stm32h735/azonenberg_mz_mit20..., deeper dive planned but haven't had a chance

STM32L431: did a full teardown https://serd.es/2025/01/02/STM32L431-teardown.html

The 12-port PHYs are a fused-down version of a switch chip so there is a MIPS core on there, but to the best of my knowledge in the switch SKU it doesn't actually run (e.g. its RAM bus is NC and the IO power rail is grounded).

The FPGA is completely programmed from the bitstream I control. Tampering with a random resold FPGA to add some kind of backdoor is extraordinarily difficult and unlikely, it's the kind of thing you would see done as a targeted attack rather than just dumping FPGAs into the secondary market and hoping that a juicy intelligence target buys them rather than some guy tinkering around with open source projects.

And, if I ever get the slightest hint that there is something fishy about silicon I bought from a sketchy overseas source, I'm gonna take it into the lab at work and go to town. I do semiconductor reverse engineering at my day job and am the absolute last person anyone should try to sneak backdoored chips past. It's going to end up getting dissected inside a SEM and turn into an awesome talk at REcon or something.

While it would be slightly annoying to have my side projects disrupted, having a living breathing nation-state silicon backdoor show up in my lab would be a dream come true. I'd be ordering as many more chips as I could from the same seller and instrumenting it in every way possible, practicing on non-backdoored chips to make absolutely certain I didn't damage any of the spicy ones while studying the altered circuits, etc.

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#15
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In this space, it's the closed source firmware blobs that nobody can inspect that I'd be a lot more worried about.

There are no blobs I'm aware of anywhere that are actually running in the system. The STM32s have a small boot "ROM" burned into a write-protected region of flash but I have it jumpered so I boot from main user flash, not the bootloader. I did a quick silicon overview of them (just out of curiosity... they came new from Digikey so I have no reason to believe they're fishy). STM32H735: top metal only https://siliconpr…

I've wargamed how I'd backdoor an FPGA even given the ability to make a completely new mask set from a fork of the original CAD files, and it's really difficult.

You'd either have to add an enormous amount of logic or have extremely detailed a priori knowledge of exactly what someone was going to use it for (down to what functions each pin was being used for). Making it meet the original factory performance and timing specs would be immensely difficult.

The best idea I had was that you could add some logic inside the transceiver IP that would understand common networking line codes and then bridge packets with certain magic header values over to an ICAP or something, so that you could enable an unauthenticated partial reconfig over IP channel.

But when you have lots of different line codes out there and don't know the bus width or configuration the user is going to have now suddenly you have to implement half a dozen different PCSes inside your fork of the GTY IP without changing the layout enough to fail timing or change the bump map enough to be visible to someone looking at the substrate or...

Small stuff like adding bypasses to bitstream encryption I could see, but nothing that would be a major risk to something like this.

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

but it would be fantastic if something like the simple 4-port switch design could be spun out as an open source project that people could iterate on. You can just get something like a Realtek single-chip switch IC and put it on a PCB. Low-port-count unmanaged switches are cheap commodity products already.

But not a cheap open source commodity

You can actually now get realtek rtl838x based ones that run openWRT. That's open firmware not open hardware, but good for most purposes.

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#18

Love seeing open hardware get traction. Curious how they’re handling cooling and power draw—those are usually the dealbreakers in DIY networking gear.

The overall system will be powered by 48V DC on a 6-pin Molex Mini-Fit Jr connector, then stepped down to 12V by a 48->12V intermediate bus converter I've previously designed and characterized (https://serd.es/2024/10/15/Intermediate-bus-converter.html)

The 24-port line card has a 15W TDP overall (6.75W datasheet worst-case power consumption for each of the two 12-port PHYs, plus 1.5W added for power supply conversion losses and such). With my current bench setup (11/12 links up on PHY 0 and 2/12 on PHY 1, all linked up at gigabit but with PHY 1 not talking to the FPGA yet), they're happy but warm - 63.8 and 49.5C die temperature respectively, pulling a combined 7.173W (not counting power conversion losses) according to the internal sensors. PCB temperature is 37.2 to 49C at various measurement points.

The entire setup including the FPGA board, IBC, one of the two planned line cards, and some other glue components that won't be in the final switch is pulling 18W and change right now although the FPGA power consumption will go up as I build out more logic. I don't have measurements of just the FPGA's power consumption currently (I could put a current clamp on the 12V cable from the IBC I guess) but the PDU board does have I2C sensors that will measure consumption of the logic board and each line card separately; I just haven't written the firmware to read them yet. I also don't have FPGA temperature readings in the current firmware although last time I checked them via JTAG I had plenty of margin.

As of right now everything is happy with low-profile heatsinks (Wakefield-Vette 960-27-12-D-AB-0 on both the PHYs and FPGA) and passively cooled just sitting on my bench with no fans. I can go taller if increased power consumption or worse airflow in the future dictates, they're nowhere near the point of hitting the top of a 1U chassis.

My plan for the final system is to have air intakes somewhere on the sides and/or the front around the RJ45s and one or more fans exhausting out the back, details TBD based on more design and testing once I have better projections of the overall thermal load.

Very roughly my overall thermal/power budget is 15W per line card = 30W combined, plus no more than 20W for the logic board (probably quite a bit less) with all ports lit up and passing packets, for a total of 50W plus whatever the losses in the IBC are (it's roughly 94% efficient at this load based on previous testing). This is comfortably below the 72W output limit of the IBC, and should be very reasonable to reject from a 1U chassis with fairly basic air cooling, especially since it's not all coming from a single point load like a single-socket server.

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#19
post #7

I wonder if the author considered at any point using Sparx-5 switch asic from Microchip? Those are available in single quantities for not too crazy price ($121 for 128G variant), and they are Linux based. Of course I understand that having custom switch engine is far more satisfying to do.

This project dates back to circa 2013 when at the time, there was nothing available in that class without NDAs. Once I got set on the path of going custom I didn't want to back off from the challenge even if an easier path became available. Also, I explicitly do not want to run embedded Linux. I much prefer bare metal on the control plane (I ended up writing a bare metal sshd because I couldn't find one that supporte…

> (I ended up writing a bare metal sshd because I couldn't find one that supported no-malloc, no-OS operation)

Is there a write up for this? This sounds interesting

Re: Open Hardware Ethernet Switch project, part 1

#20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This project dates back to circa 2013 when at the time, there was nothing available in that class without NDAs. Once I got set on the path of going custom I didn't want to back off from the challenge even if an easier path became available. Also, I explicitly do not want to run embedded Linux. I much prefer bare metal on the control plane (I ended up writing a bare metal sshd because I couldn't find one that supporte…

> (I ended up writing a bare metal sshd because I couldn't find one that supported no-malloc, no-OS operation) Is there a write up for this? This sounds interesting

The code is at https://github.com/azonenberg/staticnet but I've intentionally avoided over-publicizing it since it hasn't had any kind of third party security review. As of now it's functional enough I'm willing to deploy it on a lab network but wouldn't trust it open to an untrusted network.

I work in embedded security and have tried to avoid any of the most gross footguns, deliberately simplifying the implementation as much as possible both to optimize for deeply embedded applications with double-digit kB flash/RAM footprint, and to minimize attack surface. The only supported cipher suite is ssh-ed25519 + aes128-gcm, and I didn't implement either of those (I use the DJB reference implementation or my line-by-line FPGA port of it for the 25519, and the hardware AES + RNG on the STM32).

But I've never done a formal code review myself (not that I'd trust one done by me as the author of the offending code, but it'd be a good starting point to find low-hanging fruit before I waste somebody else's time), fuzzed it, etc.

I have a bunch of additional features I want to add (notably, IPv6 support in the TCP/IP stack is very incomplete and not yet usable) and then am going to try to get at least some friends/coworkers to bang on it more.

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