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Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

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Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#11
post #6

Criminal IMSI catchers are pretty much dead, but with the aid of carriers law enforcement can still use similar technology even with full standalone 5G networks. I don't know how often unauthorized IMSI catchers are used in the wild, but I doubt it's a relevant percentage of the total amount of IMSI catchers out there. Thanks to mmWave and beam forming, 5G allows operators to practically track you down to the exact c…

It's common to discover IMSI-catchers in national capitals around the world. There are many interesting targets.

Washington, D.C. mobile traffic is probably the most spied in the world. Especially now when it's run by technological cavemen and overly confident techbros. Israeli, Russians, Chinese, French and everyone.

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#12
post #5
post #2

iPhones, in general, will not connect to a 5G Standalone network that doesn’t have SUCI enabled.

Source?

> 5G Standalone security and privacy requirements

> To help ensure compatibility of iPhone and cellular iPad devices on private 5G SA networks, infrastructure vendors must adhere to the following security and privacy requirements:

> Privacy concealment: The Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) must use a non-null protection scheme. This can be achieved through either an on-SIM SUCI calculation or an ME SUCI calculation, as outlined in TCA 2.3.1 and 3.1 specifications. For detailed information, refer to the 3GPP Technical Specification 33.501.

(From https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/deployment/depac674731...)

This pertains to private networks rather than public operator networks, but it certainly seems to imply that use of SUCI is an expectation on 5G SA networks (private in this context).

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#13
post #8
post #6

Criminal IMSI catchers are pretty much dead, but with the aid of carriers law enforcement can still use similar technology even with full standalone 5G networks. I don't know how often unauthorized IMSI catchers are used in the wild, but I doubt it's a relevant percentage of the total amount of IMSI catchers out there. Thanks to mmWave and beam forming, 5G allows operators to practically track you down to the exact c…

> depending on how willing the firmware of your modem is, the signal used to transfer GPS coordinates to the carrier for emergency response situations can also be triggered remotely by carrier hardware Do you know if (at least some) basebands actually limit network-side location requests to emergency call/text situations only?

All I know is that some don't. I don't know brands or if there are even common modems that are filtering for this.

If you don't have a Faraday cage and cell site equipment, you're going to have a hard time verifying any of this. The modem is closed source, the SIM card is closed source, and various firmware blobs to make phones work are all closed source. I believe Qualcomm has debug interfaces on some chipsets, which might catch these messages, but verifying that they catch all use cases is impossible unless you have knowledge of the actual mechanism used (or usable) to activate the modem.

This is one of the reasons I'm hoping for the open source phone community to succeed. So far, the modem stack is usually proprietary (with hardware kill switches in the most paranoid phones), but it only takes a small group of Linux enthusiasts to actually catch the phone network in the act.

Of course, the trouble is that you'll need to be the target of government surveillance to be even at risk of any of this. If you're not a criminal or a human rights activist, the government is probably not pointing its secret spying equipment at you, and whatever criminal enterprise hacked its way into the carrier network won't either. If you are being tracked by either of those, I think developing open source modem firmware is probably the least of your concerns.

I honestly wouldn't be surprised if the standard was written to make this kind of surveillance possible and that any modem refusing to cooperate would be spec incompliant. You can read most of the 3GPP spec for free on sites like https://portal.3gpp.org/ but I don't have the time or interest to dig through the unreadable stream of abbreviations and industry terms to find out.

It's all rather pointless anyway when 5G and to an extend 4G can geolocate you about as well as GPS can, barring reflections and such.

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#14
post #10
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

SIM cards don't connect to networks, the phone modem can just disable support for such protocols. That'd probably be illegal, though, in case you're trying to call emergency services and don't have 5G reception. Some Android phones have a setting to at least disable 2G and you can easily configure them to a "preference" of only 5G. I believe iPhones have a 2G toggle as well if you enable lockdown mode. It'll be years…

> SIM cards don't connect to networks SIM cards have hundreds of various configuration knobs influencing what a (compliant) baseband does, so I wouldn’t be surprised if there was one that does just that. That said, some knobs are frustratingly missing, though – why is manually entering an APN a thing, but the default SMSC can be stored on the SIM?

That's true, of course, but SIMs can be reprogrammed by the carrier on a whim. Plus, there are handover features that command the modem to downgrade the connection from the network side, and who knows if the modem will listen to the SIM's config if the network commands it to do something.

I haven't needed to enter APNs in years, there are standards to provision those by SMS if they're missing and most of them are pre-configured in the phone's OS.

I think limiting this at the modem side will be more effective than reprogramming the SIM card, but the specifications are open enough that you could take a look at a SIM's contents by throwing it in a reader.

You could also look at the code and blobs dealing with eSIMs, as they provide the same features but often come packaged in the form of software.

Check your local laws before you start messing with SIM cards, though, altering certain identifiers can be a crime.

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#15
post #6

Criminal IMSI catchers are pretty much dead, but with the aid of carriers law enforcement can still use similar technology even with full standalone 5G networks. I don't know how often unauthorized IMSI catchers are used in the wild, but I doubt it's a relevant percentage of the total amount of IMSI catchers out there. Thanks to mmWave and beam forming, 5G allows operators to practically track you down to the exact c…

> Criminal IMSI catchers are pretty much dead,

This isn't true, there are major incidents related to IMSI-catchers going on globally right now. E.g. last week from Japan: https://newsonjapan.com/article/145466.php, https://commsrisk.com/amateur-detectives-find-numerous-fake-..., and mass arrests happening in Thailand related to the operation of them recently.

To see news related to them, search "Fake Base Stations" or "SMS Blaster", as this is how they're commonly referred to in the media now.

Other notable highlights from the last few years include: the news from Paris a few years ago where police detonated a car with an imsi-catcher in it because they thought it was a bomb, but actually the driver was being paid to send out sms spam via 2g downgrade attacks: https://commsrisk.com/paris-imsi-catcher-mistaken-for-bomb-w.... Also the attempt to disrupt the federal elections in the Phillippines using a kind of "SMS blaster" that takes advantage of unauthenticated emergency alert messages, so a step beyond the "classic" imsi catching attack that we haven't seen used in the wild before.

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#16
post #4
post #2

iPhones, in general, will not connect to a 5G Standalone network that doesn’t have SUCI enabled.

So they'll just fall back to 4G then, which always sends the IMSI in the clear on initial attach?

I don't know if you're implying that the iPhone behaviour is bad but I hope not. It's obviously better.

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#17

2025, "Rayhunter: Rust tool to detect cell site simulators on an orbic mobile hotspot" , https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43283917 2018, EFF Crocodile Hunter, https://github.com/EFForg/crocodilehunter

See also this 2019 in-depth primer on cellular attacks I wrote for EFF: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/07/announcing-gotta-catch...

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#18
post #3

I've always been wondering: Is there a SIM card configuration flag that allows telling the phone to never even attempt an attach using a given technology? This would allow leaking identifiers (at the cost of greatly reducing roaming coverage, at the moment), attaching to spoofed networks (for 2G, which does not have mutual authentication) etc.

Tangentially related, the latest major Android release supports updates from the modem with details about whenever your IMSI/IMEI/unencrypted SUCI are disclosed to the network (with support for some contextual information, e.g. which protocol message was it disclosed in), as well as insight into the in-use network cryptography configuration for different protocols.

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#19
post #3

I've always been wondering: Is there a SIM card configuration flag that allows telling the phone to never even attempt an attach using a given technology? This would allow leaking identifiers (at the cost of greatly reducing roaming coverage, at the moment), attaching to spoofed networks (for 2G, which does not have mutual authentication) etc.

if you pay the google tax for a pixel, you get a convenient 2G toggle.

if you don't have an extra $400-900 and buy a cheaper android, you get to dial ##4636## (hn screws asterisks, look it up) them go into phone info, select each sim radio and change the drop down (and hopefully you know all the standards by all names to make the right choice. hint 5G is NR there)

Re: Did 5G kill the IMSI catcher?

#20
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> SIM cards don't connect to networks SIM cards have hundreds of various configuration knobs influencing what a (compliant) baseband does, so I wouldn’t be surprised if there was one that does just that. That said, some knobs are frustratingly missing, though – why is manually entering an APN a thing, but the default SMSC can be stored on the SIM?

That's true, of course, but SIMs can be reprogrammed by the carrier on a whim. Plus, there are handover features that command the modem to downgrade the connection from the network side, and who knows if the modem will listen to the SIM's config if the network commands it to do something. I haven't needed to enter APNs in years, there are standards to provision those by SMS if they're missing and most of them are pre…

In terms of existing examples, there's a few equivalent (or at least similar) fields defined as SIM files - for example, the FPLMN (forbidden PLMN) list of networks your phone shouldn't attempt to attach to.

You're right that this needs limited at the modem - but the main user accessible method of configuring the modem is the phone UI. As this setting is one which needs network support, and is likely to disconnect a user who misconfigured this, a SIM file for permitted RAT (radio access technology) types would make sense, as SIM files are under the responsibility of the operator.

Where this would get complex is edge cases, like under roaming scenarios, where your home network can't predict what might be available, and your handset may need to permit downgrading to a technology not permitted on the home network.

The toggle in Android to disable 2G seems a start towards a user accessible setting for this, which selects what the modem is willing to join, but it's certainly far from a user friendly way to enable and disable particular technologies.

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