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How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

kibty.town

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Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#11
post #4

[flagged]

Why does it use Neko the cursor chasing cat? Why the goth color scheme? These are stylistic choices, there is no explaining them.

Thankfully there is reader mode. That dumb cat is so obnoxious on mobile.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#12
post #9
post #3

Dave here, founder of ToDesktop. I've shared a write-up: https://www.todesktop.com/blog/posts/security-incident-at-to... This vulnerability was genuinely embarrassing, and I'm sorry we let it happen. After thorough internal and third-party audits, we've fundamentally restructured our security practices to ensure this scenario can't recur. Full details are covered in the linked write-up. Special thanks to Eva for resp…

> cannot happen again. Hubris. Does not inspire confidence. > We resolved the vulnerability within 26 hours of its initial report, and additional security audits were completed by February 2025. After reading the vulnerability report, I am impressed at how quickly you guys jumped on the fix, so kudos. Did the security audit lead to any significant remediation work? If you weren't following PoLP, I wonder what else ma…

Fair point. Perhaps better phrased as "to ensure this scenario can't recur.". I'll edit my post.

Yes, we re-architected our build container as part of remediation efforts, it was quite significant.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#14
post #3

Dave here, founder of ToDesktop. I've shared a write-up: https://www.todesktop.com/blog/posts/security-incident-at-to... This vulnerability was genuinely embarrassing, and I'm sorry we let it happen. After thorough internal and third-party audits, we've fundamentally restructured our security practices to ensure this scenario can't recur. Full details are covered in the linked write-up. Special thanks to Eva for resp…

how much of a bounty was paid to Eva for this finding?

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#15
" please do not harass these companies or make it seem like it's their fault, it's not. it's todesktop's fault if anything) "

I don't get it. Why would it be "todesktop's fault", when all the mentioned companies allowed to push updates?

I had these kind of discussions with naive developers giving _full access_ to GitHub orgs to various 3rd party apps -- that's never right!

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#16

[flagged]

Finding an RCE for every computer running cursor is cool, and typing in all lowercase isn’t that cool. Finding an RCE on millions of computers has much much higher thermal mass than typing quirks, so the blog post makes typing in all lowercase cool.

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#18
post #6

My goodness. So much third-party risk upon risk and lots of external services opening up this massive attack surface and introducing this RCE vulnerability. From an Electron bundler service, to sourcemap extraction and now an exposed package.json with the container keys to deploy any app update to anyone's machine. This isn't the only one, the other day Claude CLI got a full source code leak via the same method from…

> But once again, I now know why the entire Javascript / TypeScript ecosystem is beyond saving given you can pull the source code out of the sourcemap and the full credentials out of a deployed package.json.

You've always been able to do the first thing though: the only thing you can do is obfuscate the source map, but it's not like that's a substantial slowdown when you're hunting for authentication points (identify API URLs, work backwards).

And things like credentials in package.json is just a sickness which is global to computing right now: we have so many ways you can deploy credentials, basically 0 common APIs which aren't globals (files or API keys) and even fewer security tools which acknowledge the real danger (protecting me from my computers system files is far less valuable then protecting me from code pretending to be me as my own user - where all the real valuable data already is).

Basically I'm not convinced our security model has ever truly evolved beyond the 1970s where the danger was "you damage the expensive computer" rather then "the data on the computer is worth orders of magnitude more then the computer".

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#19
> i wanted to get on the machine where the application gets built and the easiest way to do this would be a postinstall script in package.json, so i did that with a simple reverse shell payload

From ToDesktop incident report,

> This leak occurred because the build container had broader permissions than necessary, allowing a postinstall script in an application's package.json to retrieve Firebase credentials. We have since changed our architecture so that this can not happen again, see the "Infrastructure and tooling" and "Access control and authentication" sections above for more information about our fixes.

I'm curious to know what the trial/error here was to get their machine to spit out the build or if it was in one-shot

Re: How to gain code execution on hundreds of millions of people and popular apps

#20
post #14
post #3

Dave here, founder of ToDesktop. I've shared a write-up: https://www.todesktop.com/blog/posts/security-incident-at-to... This vulnerability was genuinely embarrassing, and I'm sorry we let it happen. After thorough internal and third-party audits, we've fundamentally restructured our security practices to ensure this scenario can't recur. Full details are covered in the linked write-up. Special thanks to Eva for resp…

how much of a bounty was paid to Eva for this finding?

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