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The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

edwardfeser.blogspot.com

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Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#11

Post by rini17 »

fsckboy wrote: post #10
chaboud wrote: post #3

Having not gone deep into this problem, I’m a bit confused. It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? Is it not possible that our experienc…

> It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? you've definitely hit upon the problem, but you have it exactly backward. The people who say th…

Even if it's all computation, it might be worth it to distinguish sentient and not sentient computations. I think trying to arrive to it by examining particles is a detour at best.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#12

Post by chaps »

aklein wrote: post #9
mxkopy wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The hard problem of consciousness is the same as the problem of describing to someone a color they’ve never seen before (i.e. the problem of qualia). Personally I think the information contained in qualia is finite and therefore physical but who knows

TBH, I don’t really understand why this is a problem. An explanation is not an experience; it cannot provide to the human brain the same information. Suppose you neurologically induced an experience of seeing that new color without “really” seeing it - surely this would be sufficient to communicate qualia? (And if not, surely it’s just a matter of adjusting the inducement to some degree).

This sort of philosophical question becomes more important when you think of second-order-and-beyond. Think of, in this case, that color is just a manifestation of experience. But that manifestation of experience applies to, for example, the beautiful smells that a rose throws out into the world. To a degree, the redness has an affectation on the world, which is separate to each person.

my theory is that these things are just questions of resolutions of varying latencies.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#13

Post by epiccoleman »

aklein wrote: post #9
mxkopy wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The hard problem of consciousness is the same as the problem of describing to someone a color they’ve never seen before (i.e. the problem of qualia). Personally I think the information contained in qualia is finite and therefore physical but who knows

TBH, I don’t really understand why this is a problem. An explanation is not an experience; it cannot provide to the human brain the same information. Suppose you neurologically induced an experience of seeing that new color without “really” seeing it - surely this would be sufficient to communicate qualia? (And if not, surely it’s just a matter of adjusting the inducement to some degree).

Isn't "an explanation is not an experience" basically the problem? Like, if you could perfectly describe all the physical conditions to induce the experience of a color, there would still be something missing from that description which you can't get without consciousness in the loop. You can't communicate or describe it without the actual experience part.

Most (all?) of our "science" doesn't require any sort of notion of consciousness to work, we can describe the motion of a projectile or an orbit in a way that doesn't depend on having an "experiencer." But there's this weird category of stuff for which that isn't true. (At least, for now).

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#14

Post by pcwalton »

To provide some context: It's important to keep in mind that Edward Feser is an extremely traditionalist Catholic, and neo-Aristotelian, philosopher. His writings frequently assume that the reader has a background in this niche subject area, which most users here (including me) don't. If you aren't really familiar with the contents of the Summa Theologica, you probably won't get much out of Feser's essays.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#15

Post by ergonaught »

This sort of sloppy, shoddy, “I don’t like how I feel about it therefore it must be false” type of thinking has fallen to analysis and the scientific method every single time they meet. The sloppy retreats to another bastion but it merely delays the inevitable.

That materialistic, mechanical, “mathematically reductionist” brains might produce the particular qualia isn’t a hard problem. We alter the brain and the qualia of experience are altered: it is unavoidable that the brain is involved in generating the experience.

The actually hard problem is how (or whether) chemistry can generate awareness, into/onto which the qualia of experience arise.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#16

Post by andoando »

chaboud wrote: post #3

Having not gone deep into this problem, I’m a bit confused. It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? Is it not possible that our experienc…

Is consciousness not special? It certainly isn't obvious to me my experience of the world isn't present in all matter. And how is it obvious that is a fundamental product of matter?

It seems to me youre just taking the opposite as an axiom without any basis.

My personal belief is the two viewpoints are not so contradictory. Consciousness can be a fundamental part of all matter (not simply an emergent phenomena or product of matter). This is no more magic to me than admitting matter has "energy" or does things randomly.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#17

Post by adrianN »

fsckboy wrote: post #10
chaboud wrote: post #3

Having not gone deep into this problem, I’m a bit confused. It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? Is it not possible that our experienc…

> It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? you've definitely hit upon the problem, but you have it exactly backward. The people who say th…

We don’t have a definition of consciousness that allows you to determine whether an electron is conscious or not. Until we have that it’s quite pointless to discuss whether this phenomenon is magic or not imo. Furthermore, I don't think it's trivial to distinguish between magic and physics.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#18

Post by yibg »

fsckboy wrote: post #10
chaboud wrote: post #3

Having not gone deep into this problem, I’m a bit confused. It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? Is it not possible that our experienc…

> It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? you've definitely hit upon the problem, but you have it exactly backward. The people who say th…

You seem to be overloading the word "physical"? Information and computation are physical manifestations of e.g. electrons and physical bits. Information are stored (as far as we know) on physical things like memory or the brain. e.g. you damage the brain and memory goes away.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#19

Post by samatman »

This is the exact point where I always get off the hard problem p-zombie train:

> It is possible at least in principle, he says, for there to be a world physically identical to our own down to the last particle, but where there are none of the qualia of conscious experience.

No. I don't consider this possible even in principle. Imaginable, yes, possible? No.

One example is enough to dispose of any contradiction, so here's one: in this contrafactual world, a person says "I feel the sun warming my skin". Since qualia do not exist in the contrafactual, in that world, the person is a liar. In this world, he is not. That is a difference: QED.

Ah, but you may say: this is not a physical difference. No, perhaps not. But it most rapidly results in one. Liars and honest men are not the same. Especially when they lie about having any and every experience of existence. This is a difference which must perforce produce change: it beggars the imagination to picture such a world careening forwards identical to our own.

This is not physics. It is fantasy.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#20

Post by yibg »

epiccoleman wrote: post #13
aklein wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

TBH, I don’t really understand why this is a problem. An explanation is not an experience; it cannot provide to the human brain the same information. Suppose you neurologically induced an experience of seeing that new color without “really” seeing it - surely this would be sufficient to communicate qualia? (And if not, surely it’s just a matter of adjusting the inducement to some degree).

Isn't "an explanation is not an experience" basically the problem? Like, if you could perfectly describe all the physical conditions to induce the experience of a color, there would still be something missing from that description which you can't get without consciousness in the loop. You can't communicate or describe it without the actual experience part. Most (all?) of our "science" doesn't require any sort of noti…

Doesn't that just point to the fact that our ability to describe is limited and lossy? In the color example, we're trying to convey information about the effects of one of the senses without using that sense. It could very well be that without using that particular sense, the brain just isn't stimulated the same way.
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