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Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

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Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#11
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You are right, however the existence of alternatives is extremely important and should always be mentioned.

If you're Lennart, the existence of alternatives is a nuisance, so no need to give them free publicity.

Haha, I didn't realize the article was from our beloved friend.

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#12
> Instead of stealing your laptop the attacker takes the harddisk from your laptop while you aren't watching [...] makes a copy of it, and then puts it back.

I've never understood why people keep making this incredibly weak argument for secure boot.

Secure boot makes sense for a college computer lab, where any disk encryption is better than nothing, and you can't give everyone the password or it'd defeat the point.

Secure boot makes sense if you're a Microsoft-only company, as it's a closed-source OS anyway and Microsoft have the code-signing keys. It means your users only have one password to type in - and helpdesk can reset it remotely if a user forgets.

Secure boot makes sense if you're making something like an xbox or tivo where you want disk encryption but you can't give the owner the password, as they're the adversary you're trying to protect against.

And yet people instead ignore these benefits, and go for this spy thriller nonsense as if people are going to be crawling through the air vents and abseiling from the ceiling to interfere with my computer? If you're going to pretend to be James Bond you'd better also be learning ballroom dancing, kung fu, skiing and foreign languages.

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#13
post #5

> the attacker takes the harddisk from your laptop while you aren't watching > You'll never notice they did that. Won't you be safe if you put a colorful nail polish to your laptop screws and take picture of its pattern? Then you regularly compare the actual pattern with your picture.

:DDD And you gonna check it every time? Nah, humans are not wired to this.

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#14
post #5

> the attacker takes the harddisk from your laptop while you aren't watching > You'll never notice they did that. Won't you be safe if you put a colorful nail polish to your laptop screws and take picture of its pattern? Then you regularly compare the actual pattern with your picture.

:DDD And you gonna check it every time? Nah, humans are not wired to this.

Yes, if I expect such an expensive, targeted attack on me. This is a Snowden's case, not for normal folk.

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#15

> Instead of stealing your laptop the attacker takes the harddisk from your laptop while you aren't watching [...] makes a copy of it, and then puts it back. I've never understood why people keep making this incredibly weak argument for secure boot. Secure boot makes sense for a college computer lab, where any disk encryption is better than nothing, and you can't give everyone the password or it'd defeat the point. S…

What do average people do when something happens with their secure boot? Search the web, and apply whatever they find, hoping that their system boots again. They want a solution under 1 minute, and don't care whether they expose their system. Secure boot is utterly complicated, a mess, and badly documented and people doesn't know shit about it.

And we want this to be default for users? I like lennart's work, but this further complicates things A LOT. What happens in case of hardware failure? If parts of the drive becomes unreadable and you need to retrieve as much data as possible? Oops you forgot to enroll your recovery key...

What will people do to avoid data loss and to avoid learning how the system as a whole works? Create backups and those will be stolen by nefarious entities instead.

Linux is mostly not so complicated. But this latest post... if this becomes the norm, oh god, unnecessarily complicated way to protect against imaginary threat. How widespread these hard disk removals are in the wild? I know maybe 1 case in the last 10 years that was publicised.

People are paranoid about things they can't control and don't understand at all, and these measures calm their nerves. Whew, I'm so important, my data is so important, now I'm protecced. While the ones who really want your data already waltz in anytime they want into your system and you can't do shit against it, because you are expert at max in one domain. The threat modelling already tells you that the compromise you have to take is that there are peepz you can't defend against.

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

:DDD And you gonna check it every time? Nah, humans are not wired to this.

Yes, if I expect such an expensive, targeted attack on me. This is a Snowden's case, not for normal folk.

And that is 1 user in a million. So we force people to do everyday things in a bulletproof vest, because of that 1:1000000 use case?

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#17

> Instead of stealing your laptop the attacker takes the harddisk from your laptop while you aren't watching [...] makes a copy of it, and then puts it back. I've never understood why people keep making this incredibly weak argument for secure boot. Secure boot makes sense for a college computer lab, where any disk encryption is better than nothing, and you can't give everyone the password or it'd defeat the point. S…

> And yet people instead ignore these benefits, and go for this spy thriller nonsense as if people are going to be crawling through the air vents and abseiling from the ceiling to interfere with my computer?

CBP and other countries' "border control" routinely forces people to let them examine their devices. That's bad enough, I'd at least be happy if there were an attestable way these pigs don't install malware on peoples' devices.

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, if I expect such an expensive, targeted attack on me. This is a Snowden's case, not for normal folk.

And that is 1 user in a million. So we force people to do everyday things in a bulletproof vest, because of that 1:1000000 use case?

If you don't expect such an attack, then with your threat model you don't need to do that.

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#19

> Instead of stealing your laptop the attacker takes the harddisk from your laptop while you aren't watching [...] makes a copy of it, and then puts it back. I've never understood why people keep making this incredibly weak argument for secure boot. Secure boot makes sense for a college computer lab, where any disk encryption is better than nothing, and you can't give everyone the password or it'd defeat the point. S…

> Secure boot makes sense if you're a Microsoft-only company

Yes, the author is actually working at MS: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lennart_Poettering

Re: Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux (2021)

#20

> Instead of stealing your laptop the attacker takes the harddisk from your laptop while you aren't watching [...] makes a copy of it, and then puts it back. I've never understood why people keep making this incredibly weak argument for secure boot. Secure boot makes sense for a college computer lab, where any disk encryption is better than nothing, and you can't give everyone the password or it'd defeat the point. S…

What do average people do when something happens with their secure boot? Search the web, and apply whatever they find, hoping that their system boots again. They want a solution under 1 minute, and don't care whether they expose their system. Secure boot is utterly complicated, a mess, and badly documented and people doesn't know shit about it. And we want this to be default for users? I like lennart's work, but this…

In a data loss situation you image the drive and decrypt it with your recovery key.

That has nothing to do with secure boot. You won't lose access to the drive, the issue is that you want to mostly not use that recovery key all the time.

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