I'm surprised it didn't do more than touch on probably the biggest reason: we already pay a huge amount for education out of taxes, so the educational budgets are allocated by bureaucrats, and not by education consumers (or their parents).
Spence signalling[1] won the econ Nobel back in 2001. It says that the cost of signalling in a market for imperfect information ends on the one emitting the signal.
For education and jobs, the signal is your degree (hence the huge career difference between dropping out one week before getting a degree and completing). The cost of the degree will fall on the student.
The employer can easily diminish the hiring problem by pre-sorting applicants by education. Students know there is a large difference in career outcomes between university education required jobs and the ones below that.
Colleges want to extract as close to 100% of this lifetime earning difference as they can.
The main question at this point in education research is "how much" signalling is a component of education versus actually teaching skills.
For tech, almost no certificate provides a comparable signal to a real degree.