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Ooofff. No bolts at all! How did this pass Boeing QA?
>The CVR was downloaded successfully; however, it was determined that the audio from the accident flight had been overwritten. The CVR circuit breaker had not been manually deactivated after the airplane landed following the accident in time to preserve the accident flight recording.
Classic. If they use CD quality audio at 1411kbps, they can store 2 hours of audio in about 1.2 GB. Given how cheap flash is these days, why not 20x that so that we don't have to rely on people pulling circuit breakers after accidents? If there's some concern about robustness and recertification, why not require all aircraft to carry two CVRs, one of the old "robust" style for kinetic accidents, and one that's less robust but has 20x the capacity, so we can record a full day after less violent accidents?
> Overall, the observed damage patterns and absence of contact damage or deformation around holes associated with the vertical movement arrestor bolts and upper guide track bolts in the upper guide fittings, hinge fittings, and recovered aft lower hinge guide fitting indicate that the four bolts that prevent upward movement of the MED plug were missing before the MED plug moved upward off the stop pads. Ooofff. No bo…
https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/146074-boeing-inte...
Smells like CISCO
> The accident airplane was required to be equipped with a CVR that retained, at minimum, the last 2 hours of audio information, including flight crew communications and other sounds inside the cockpit. >The CVR was downloaded successfully; however, it was determined that the audio from the accident flight had been overwritten. The CVR circuit breaker had not been manually deactivated after the airplane landed follow…
> Overall, the observed damage patterns and absence of contact damage or deformation around holes associated with the vertical movement arrestor bolts and upper guide track bolts in the upper guide fittings, hinge fittings, and recovered aft lower hinge guide fitting indicate that the four bolts that prevent upward movement of the MED plug were missing before the MED plug moved upward off the stop pads. Ooofff. No bo…
> Overall, the observed damage patterns and absence of contact damage or deformation around holes associated with the vertical movement arrestor bolts and upper guide track bolts in the upper guide fittings, hinge fittings, and recovered aft lower hinge guide fitting indicate that the four bolts that prevent upward movement of the MED plug were missing before the MED plug moved upward off the stop pads. Ooofff. No bo…
> How did this pass Boeing QA? https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/146074-boeing-inte...