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iMessage Key Verification

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Re: iMessage Key Verification

#11
This seems somewhat similar to Matrix's (and other apps') approach of comparing keys to verify identity (plus with I guess some extra hardware requirements and attestation).

I'm interested to see what the uptake is among users, because even though Matrix has done a fair amount to smooth this process, verification is still a pretty large source of friction from what I can tell, and I'm not completely sure how it could be made easier. I guess the idea here is that once you verify a contact that syncs to their other devices, but in theory Matrix also does that, and in practice I still see some friction.

It's possible Apple's implementation will just be better, or that they'll rely on attestation to such a degree that they'll be able to skip some other friction points. But even with the public verification setup (which gets rid of the problem of needing to verify devices at the same time as the person you're talking to), I'm still slightly skeptical that users are going to copy and paste a code into their messaging app to verify contacts. My experience is that even popping up a button and saying, "do your friend and you see the same emoticons" is too much work for a lot of users.

Maybe I'll be wrong. And I guess ideally if iOS users get used to doing this, they might be more tolerant of doing the same thing in other messengers too.

Re: iMessage Key Verification

#14

This seems somewhat similar to Matrix's (and other apps') approach of comparing keys to verify identity (plus with I guess some extra hardware requirements and attestation). I'm interested to see what the uptake is among users, because even though Matrix has done a fair amount to smooth this process, verification is still a pretty large source of friction from what I can tell, and I'm not completely sure how it could…

Trevor Perrin, who co-designed the Signal Protocol, made the point that most people don’t have to do this. If a few people do, an adversary won’t know if the target is verified or not. If they MITM they might be discovered instantly. Which gives the entire herd protection.

- https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=2001&v=7WnwSovjYMs

Re: iMessage Key Verification

#15
How safe is the contact that is uploaded to the iCloud? How safe is the contact from being modified by some app on your iPhone? The contact containing the verification code seems to be one of the weaker link in this whole thing.

If Mallory can change the verification code in the contact to their own, the communication between Alice and Bob is no longer protected.

Re: iMessage Key Verification

#16
post #15

How safe is the contact that is uploaded to the iCloud? How safe is the contact from being modified by some app on your iPhone? The contact containing the verification code seems to be one of the weaker link in this whole thing. If Mallory can change the verification code in the contact to their own, the communication between Alice and Bob is no longer protected.

They can't just change the verification code, and it's not based on the fields of the contact card. You can think of it as a fingerprint for their iMessage public key, the one used to encrypt messages end-to-end. If the key with which your phone encrypts iMessage payloads has changed, it indicates that the conversation is being intercepted.

WhatsApp supports this too, see "Verify Security Code" on this page: https://faq.whatsapp.com/820124435853543

So does Signal: https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007060632-Wh...

So does Telegram: https://telegram.org/faq#q-what-is-this-39encryption-key-39-...

Re: iMessage Key Verification

#17
post #14

This seems somewhat similar to Matrix's (and other apps') approach of comparing keys to verify identity (plus with I guess some extra hardware requirements and attestation). I'm interested to see what the uptake is among users, because even though Matrix has done a fair amount to smooth this process, verification is still a pretty large source of friction from what I can tell, and I'm not completely sure how it could…

Trevor Perrin, who co-designed the Signal Protocol, made the point that most people don’t have to do this. If a few people do, an adversary won’t know if the target is verified or not. If they MITM they might be discovered instantly. Which gives the entire herd protection. - https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=2001&v=7WnwSovjYMs

Not a great argument IMO. If only 0.1% people check the keys, the attacker may be just okay with the 0.1% chance of being discovered – especially if there's no consequences for them.

Re: iMessage Key Verification

#18

This seems somewhat similar to Matrix's (and other apps') approach of comparing keys to verify identity (plus with I guess some extra hardware requirements and attestation). I'm interested to see what the uptake is among users, because even though Matrix has done a fair amount to smooth this process, verification is still a pretty large source of friction from what I can tell, and I'm not completely sure how it could…

Tangential, but Keybase (and later Keyoxide [1]) with their “social proof” mechanics are a more human-friendly way to verify the encryption keys. I kinda wish Matrix had that integrated, too.

[1]: Here's my Keyoxide page for example: https://keyoxide.org/alexander@notpushk.in

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