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Isn't this essentially Max Tegmark's Mathematical Universe hypothesis?
For reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothes...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is indeed similar. It seems to take a highly reductionist pathway: reality/experience can be simulated -> simulation is computation -> computation is mathematics -> mathematical objects exist regardless of whether anybody has discovered them. This implies that all conceivable universes (including the ones where a lot of really bad things happen on an eternal loop) are possessed of the exact same reality as ours.
Am I missing something here? I can suppose a universe where the premise is false (This is a conceivable universe, I’d argue). Doesn’t that mean that this premise really is false?
The number states do not magically appear in the physical universe merely by thinking up the construction. The numbers could be configured as (temporary) patterns in physical objects, such as brains, books, or in ink molecules on paper. But the states are not physical objects themselves.
Also, if our universe happens to be universal, in the sense that it encompasses all of existence, then how could a calculation device exist outside of it? I'm not saying this is necessarily the case, but it's an option that many simulation-believers overlook. The calculation device might be part of the existence, but it seems rather unlikely that it can then predict reality faster than it unfolds.
Note that quantum modelling those effects go as O(a^N). If you want to hand-wave away exponential computational cost, then I cry foul: the details matter, and I posit that you cannot build a computer that is more powerful than the universe itself.
I really like Iain M. Banks moral argument against universe being simulated. No intelligence capable of simulating it would be immoral enough to create something so horrible. Unless they are a total bastard. So it's not a 100%.
Take a smaller example: weather on Earth. There are a LOT of particles, but still classically simulatable. Chaos ensures that we still cannot know all future states of the weather. This is a remarkable truth, and one should give it time to sink in. Note that quantum modelling those effects go as O(a^N). If you want to hand-wave away exponential computational cost, then I cry foul: the details matter, and I posit that…
What I'm suggesting is that the calculation never needs to be done, which means the complexity of it does not matter. Whether it's O(1) or O(a^N) they're both far smaller than the infinite number of potential states.
Take a smaller example: weather on Earth. There are a LOT of particles, but still classically simulatable. Chaos ensures that we still cannot know all future states of the weather. This is a remarkable truth, and one should give it time to sink in. Note that quantum modelling those effects go as O(a^N). If you want to hand-wave away exponential computational cost, then I cry foul: the details matter, and I posit that…
Sure, but this argument is for simulation theory... not what is described here. What I'm suggesting is that the calculation never needs to be done, which means the complexity of it does not matter . Whether it's O(1) or O(a^N) they're both far smaller than the infinite number of potential states.
Well, that's your preference then. But personally I want to see the Mets play the Yankees because it's profoundly unsatisfying to believe that all possible outcomes are computable and therefore on an equal basis. I daresay that idea is so bad that if you took it seriously, it would die out with your genes/memes. (Not that that matters since you could travel to and impregnate every woman on Earth).
This argument seems to mix up "existence" and "construction". The number states do not magically appear in the physical universe merely by thinking up the construction. The numbers could be configured as (temporary) patterns in physical objects, such as brains, books, or in ink molecules on paper. But the states are not physical objects themselves. Also, if our universe happens to be universal, in the sense that it e…
... but that's different to what I've argued here. I'm not claiming the states are physical objects, but just the existing of the pattern, even if temporary or intangible, would feel real to the humans/actors inside it.
Isn't this essentially Max Tegmark's Mathematical Universe hypothesis?
I hadn't heard of it before, and will need to do some more reading, but at a high-level it does look to be the same line of thinking.