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We reported a security issue in AWS CDK’s eks.Cluster component

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Re: We reported a security issue in AWS CDK’s eks.Cluster component

#11
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Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure if I'm reading this correctly. The statements below are my understanding, but it'd be great if you can confirm to provide more color. The pre-patch setup would just make the implicit trust policy explicit, meaning any user or role in the account with `sts:AssumeRole` on `*` could assume the role (which is still the default when not trust policy is specified). This change improves the posture by adding a…

Another default policy to consider is any Lambda function role. They never specify which Lambda can assume them (because that would create a cyclical dependency). That means anyone with permissions to create a Lambda will be able to technically assume this role. Just like you, I'm not arguing the defense in depth part. Always a good idea to put fine-grained permissions where possible. But I also find the "vulnerabili…

That's a bit different and (like ec2 and other services) governed by IAM:Passrole. Whoever creates the lambda or ec2 needs to be allowed to assign that role. Otherwise it would allow privilege escalation.

Re: We reported a security issue in AWS CDK’s eks.Cluster component

#12
This special creation role has always puzzled me a bit. Why does there need to be a special role with unrevokeable root privileges? I understand that it's useful, but why can't I at some point revoke its privileges when I'm done bootstrapping the cluster? If I do that in such a way that I need AWS support to help me get into a cluster I've locked myself out of, so be it.
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