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Add Honest Achmed's root certificate (2011)

bugzilla.mozilla.org

11–20 of 29 posts

Re: Add Honest Achmed's root certificate (2011)

#11
post #5

I never find this kind of stuff funny... it's more snark than humor. It's also got a weird racial tinge on the tiresome trope of a somewhat distrustful middle eastern laborer, which makes it gross.

How is he somewhat distrustful? He’s Honest Achmed, it’s right there in the name. And the application is certainly very honest.

Re: Add Honest Achmed's root certificate (2011)

#12
post #5

I never find this kind of stuff funny... it's more snark than humor. It's also got a weird racial tinge on the tiresome trope of a somewhat distrustful middle eastern laborer, which makes it gross.

When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Re: Add Honest Achmed's root certificate (2011)

#14
post #3

Classic of the genre. I remember around the time of the diginotar horrors looking at DANE and DNSSEC. As I understand it, DANE still isn't supported by browsers, and DNSSEC is still in a pitiful state.

DANE is a great idea in theory, botched by a bad practical implementation and low deployment (how much of that is related to the influence of the CA mafia is left as an exercise to the reader). There is some hope for the future: https://www.sidn.nl/en/news-and-blogs/new-opportunity-for-da...

Re: Add Honest Achmed's root certificate (2011)

#17

Seems quite racist to me using the stereotype of the middle eastern shady used cars dealer? Do we want such content here (I'd say no)?

> Seems quite racist to me

So if it was Honest John you would be okay with that?

> Do we want such content here (I'd say no)?

You have 'flag' and 'downvote' buttons for this.

Re: Add Honest Achmed's root certificate (2011)

#19
post #10

For a long time, I've argued we need leaf certificates to be double signable. That way there can be two chains of trust for a website. Then dropping a CA doesn't matter much, since all serious parties should have multiply signed paths to various roots of trust. Hence we solve the problem of CAs becoming to big to fail. The current way cross-signing works is almost an accident, and only works for intermediate certific…

I see what you meant--having two for redundancy--but I was much more excited by the idea of having two where both had to be valid, as getting two organizations to issue you a bogus certificate is going to be a hell of a lot harder than getting one (not impossible, but often an entirely different kind of attack). Maybe we require three and at least two have to be valid, providing the benefits of both angles? ;P
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