Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think it is quite profound since many people seem to fear death because they imagine it is nothingness. But nothingness contains neither things to be feared nor a perceiver to fear them if they did. On the other hand I highly doubt that nothingness actually exists. Why should we expect the arising of experience to be a one off occurrence ? If the void exists it has a major bug because experience (ie. non-void) some…
Hmm I guess after attaining my current worldview and dropping religion, I stopped worrying about death as a “state”. Because I was not uncomfortable before I was born I always reasoned. I tell my kids the same if they ask what is after death? I ask them back, what was it like before being born? It will be like that. Of course I still don't want to die.
Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
11–20 of 34 posts
Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#12Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#13What an enormous amount of words just to say: When you die you are not there anymore to experience the nothingness that you often picture death to be like. I kept thinking that something profound was coming but no. Edit: Perhaps it is interesting that so many non-theistic historical figures do reference death as a nothingness and suggest that that nothingness is somehow experienced by some remainder of one’s being, w…
Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#14What an enormous amount of words just to say: When you die you are not there anymore to experience the nothingness that you often picture death to be like. I kept thinking that something profound was coming but no. Edit: Perhaps it is interesting that so many non-theistic historical figures do reference death as a nothingness and suggest that that nothingness is somehow experienced by some remainder of one’s being, w…
Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#15The reification of the nothingness after death is warranted insofar as we compare it to the alternative of not dying. The continued life is certainly a real thing, so there is (negative?) reality to its absence. Otherwise murder wouldn’t be a felony.
Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#16Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#17Shout out to Peter F. Hamilton’s Reality Dysfunction trilogy, in which an interstellar humanity is threatened by the discovery that souls persist after death. Recommended for my fellow sci-fi aficionados.
Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#18Earlier quoted context omitted.
>Why should we expect the arising of experience to be a one off occurrence ? Given 7.9 billion people alive right now, give or take, I'm not quite sure where the idea it might be a one-off occurrence comes from. But even if you mean our individual personal experience, I'm not sure what that would mean. A copy of me would think and experience in ways similar to me to a point, but we would still have different and dist…
Well, I think that most people don't believe in reincarnation.
The idea leads to so many questions. In your version, is the reincarnated person conscious of their past selves? If not, is that any different than a clone? What happens between death and reincarnation? How does the math work? Is there an upper limit to the number of human consciousnesses that can be incarnated at once? Non-human consciousnesses? Non-sentient ones?
Along those lines: what is it that links (solely) my body with (solely) my consciousness? Why do I experience only my own experiences and not that of my friend's? How can I prove to myself that I'm not a brain in a vat?
Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#19Could someone explain to a layman what this article is trying to say?
Now imagine if it were possible to instantly and cheaply travel to Paris this way. Many people would likely be just fine with doing this.
Now imagine that one day, the transporter doesn't destroy the original you and now two copies of you exist. From that moment on, the individual experiences diverge but each copy believes it's the original.
If ten days after that a technician came and said "ok, time to disintegrate you, don't worry, your copy in Paris is A-OK" I think that most people wouldn't agree to be disintegrated just because another mostly identical consciousness is alive.
And yet, if it were to happen flawlessly and instantaneously, likely that same existential fear doesn't exist. Most people think the star trek transporter is pretty cool.
But why? We have to realize that our consciousness is really an evolutionary trick that's expedient for our continued survival. The idea that the survival of my own ego and continuous conscious experience is pretty much the basest mechanism I have that makes me value staying alive.
But there's a paradox in the case of my exact copy. Logically, I shouldn't care of the star trek transporter works instantaneously or not. Let's say that it makes a copy that exists for twenty minutes before disintegrating me, but I have no way of knowing that and instead just sit in a room bored for twenty minutes until disintegration. Functionally that's a nearly identical experience to instant transport, but also seems a lot more like the broken transporter scenario.
But let's say this is the future of travel and everyone accepts the fact that my continued conscious experience is what's really important, so I'm willing to be disintegrated painlessly as long as a copy of me exists somewhere else in the universe.
That's not too big a leap to make, but it seems strange, right? Why am I not then just fine being disintegrated as long as any consciousness continues to exist?
My answer to that question is that it's an evolutionary advantage to want to live, therefore we want to live. A bit of circular reasoning. It's also our species' biggest unquestioned assumption too - that consciousness and self-awareness is better than the alternative. But "better" might just be "important to the survival of the human species."
I think the article touches on that.
Re: Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
#20Could someone explain to a layman what this article is trying to say?
Imagine a star trek transporter was a real thing. In that show, I think the common explanation was that the transporter didn't send you places, but merely created a copy of you somewhere else and destroyed the original. Now imagine if it were possible to instantly and cheaply travel to Paris this way. Many people would likely be just fine with doing this. Now imagine that one day, the transporter doesn't destroy the…