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Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

blog.heroku.com

11–17 of 17 posts

Re: Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

#11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's basically the only paragraph of new information in the whole... well, let's call it what it is, a press release basically. It is a thing to know. That they had a token checked into source code that probably shouldn't have been, and that the attacker somehow got access to the source code in a private github repo. * yeah, we still don't know how. Which is kind of important. But figuring out how they got access t…

> is to some extent back on github How is it on Github? We know that it was a third-party integration that compromised. Almost every single third-party integration needs the ability to read source code. The fault here lies on Heroku for storing secrets that allowed access to their main customer database in a source code repo that was accessible to a third-party provider, as well as with the third party provider (what…

> How is it on Github?…

The whole sentence I wrote was: "But figuring out how they got access to a private github repo is to some extent back on github, at least potentially..."

> …That feels like a failure of logging on Github's part, without any additional information.

There you go, you answered your own question too.

Re: Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

#12
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is it known who at Github can access private customer repos?

I'd assume everyone who works there. They aren't encrypted or anything. If you have hardware access you have full github access.

But I can definitively say that any repo access is heavily logged. And this info is from like almost 10 years ago when I had first hand experience. I know they've upped their game in terms of repository access gating since then.

Re: Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

#13
post #4
post #2

> We began investigating how the threat actor gained initial access to the environment and determined it was obtained by leveraging a compromised token for a Heroku machine account. We determined that the unidentified threat actor gained access to the machine account from an archived private GitHub repository containing Heroku source code. We assessed that the threat actor accessed the repository via a third-party in…

It's a little hard to parse parts of that paragraph, but it sounds like the repo (presumably hosted on GitHub) had access tokens granted to third party integrations (similar to Heroku being granted access to GitHub on behalf of their mutual users). Assuming that's true, it should be trivial for GitHub to tell them which third party integration the token was associated with.

AIUI, the repo contained a single token that gave access to Heroku. Additionally, a bunch of third party tools had legitimate access to the repo. Any one of them could have been used to steal the token.

Re: Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

#14
post #4
post #2

> We began investigating how the threat actor gained initial access to the environment and determined it was obtained by leveraging a compromised token for a Heroku machine account. We determined that the unidentified threat actor gained access to the machine account from an archived private GitHub repository containing Heroku source code. We assessed that the threat actor accessed the repository via a third-party in…

It's a little hard to parse parts of that paragraph, but it sounds like the repo (presumably hosted on GitHub) had access tokens granted to third party integrations (similar to Heroku being granted access to GitHub on behalf of their mutual users). Assuming that's true, it should be trivial for GitHub to tell them which third party integration the token was associated with.

[deleted]

Re: Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

#15
Side note on Heroku: they've been very aggressively upgrading old app dependencies this week (I've had ~9 apps go down for mandatory Postgres maintenance in the last 24h, with almost no notice for some of them). With how little information they've given regarding this incident, I can't help but wonder if it's related.

Re: Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

#16
post #2

> We began investigating how the threat actor gained initial access to the environment and determined it was obtained by leveraging a compromised token for a Heroku machine account. We determined that the unidentified threat actor gained access to the machine account from an archived private GitHub repository containing Heroku source code. We assessed that the threat actor accessed the repository via a third-party in…

Maybe it was via Travis CI? https://blog.travis-ci.com/2022-04-17-securitybulletin

Re: Heroku April 2022 Incident Review

#17
post #2

> We began investigating how the threat actor gained initial access to the environment and determined it was obtained by leveraging a compromised token for a Heroku machine account. We determined that the unidentified threat actor gained access to the machine account from an archived private GitHub repository containing Heroku source code. We assessed that the threat actor accessed the repository via a third-party in…

That's basically the only paragraph of new information in the whole... well, let's call it what it is, a press release basically. It is a thing to know. That they had a token checked into source code that probably shouldn't have been, and that the attacker somehow got access to the source code in a private github repo. * yeah, we still don't know how. Which is kind of important. But figuring out how they got access t…

You don't like granting report admin access to tokens that just need to read issues?

It's simple.

/S

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