I think the gist of the article is this: Suppose you make 1000 people take a test. Suppose all 1000 of these people are utterly incapable of evaluating themselves, so they just estimate their grade as a uniform random variable between 0-100, with an average of 50. You plot the grades of each of the 4 quartiles and it shows a linear increase as expected. Let's say the bottom quartile had an average of 20, and the top…
That's the way I understand the statistical analysis, and in my view this exactly supports (not contradicts) DK: > In reality, nobody had any clue how to estimate their own success. Wouldn't that mean unskilled people tend to overestimate their skill, and experts tend to underestimate it? Why is there a contradiction with DK's conclusions?
I think it's because the original paper speculates far beyond it:
> The authors suggest that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it.
The argument about autocorrelation says this "dual burden" doesn't need to be there to observe the effect.