Live data from Hacker News

Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

benwr.net

11–20 of 124 posts

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#11
post #4

Kolmogorov complexity/entropy is more suitable for this purpose, under the implicit assumption that password crackers don't have tailored prior knowledge and are just enumerating "simple" sequences. It only agrees with Shannon entropy on long ergodic sequences. The author basically constructed an example where the two notions don't agree.

How would you estimate the Kolmogorov complexity for the author's example?

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#12
> Because choosing good passwords is about memorableness as well as sheer strength

That's not been true ever since the development of good password managers. There are fewer than 10 passwords I remember. One of them is my password manager's master passphrase (5 misspelled-and-with-random-punctuation words). The others include stuff like my work and home laptop/disk passwords, which I can't autofill, my 3 important banking passwords which I do not even entrust to my password manager, and my AppleID password because iOS is annoying enough at asking for that that I'm using one I can remember.

The other ~600 entries in my password manager are 25 random characters (or whatever the upper limit if password length is for sites/services that are 'doin it wrong').

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#13
Cool example. An attacker will take 2^234 guesses on average to guess the password, but that's an average of 19 1's and one enormous number. So the attacker will usually guess the answer quickly. It's kind of like the St. Petersburg paradox in that the expectation value doesn't reflect typical behavior.

Seems like this might be a use case for "dispersion" (the second moment of entropy) [1].

[1] https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1626522/higher-mome...

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#14
post #4

Kolmogorov complexity/entropy is more suitable for this purpose, under the implicit assumption that password crackers don't have tailored prior knowledge and are just enumerating "simple" sequences. It only agrees with Shannon entropy on long ergodic sequences. The author basically constructed an example where the two notions don't agree.

How would you estimate the Kolmogorov complexity for the author's example?

Kolmogorov complexity is only unambiguously defined asymptotically, and "asymptotics is merely a heuristic". It is also uncomputable. So, to use entropy arguments for passwords, the only correct way I could think of is to generate long and (elementwise) random passwords.

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#15
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How would you estimate the Kolmogorov complexity for the author's example?

Kolmogorov complexity is only unambiguously defined asymptotically, and "asymptotics is merely a heuristic". It is also uncomputable. So, to use entropy arguments for passwords, the only correct way I could think of is to generate long and (elementwise) random passwords.

You asserted that Kolmogorov complexity will disagree with Shannon entropy in this example, so how do you know what the Kolmogorov complexity of this example is?

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#17
post #12

> Because choosing good passwords is about memorableness as well as sheer strength That's not been true ever since the development of good password managers. There are fewer than 10 passwords I remember. One of them is my password manager's master passphrase (5 misspelled-and-with-random-punctuation words). The others include stuff like my work and home laptop/disk passwords, which I can't autofill, my 3 important ba…

> That's not been true ever since the development of good password managers.

A lot of people (do not trust password managers, case in point the recent last pass scare.

You want passwords to your key accounts to be 1) memorable 2) strong 3) only in your head. For these, I think the article is fairly relevant.

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#18
When will we stop using passwords?! They are an elementary school kid “secret club” game taken way, way too far. They are totally broken. Nobody can come up with and remember good passwords. Nobody can store passwords securely. 100% busted.

Instead of continuing to debate what makes a good password, we need to put our energy into better techniques altogether! No more shared secrets! Let’s talk about one-time codes, asymmetric key cryptography, hardware tokens, anything but passwords!!

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#19
post #12

> Because choosing good passwords is about memorableness as well as sheer strength That's not been true ever since the development of good password managers. There are fewer than 10 passwords I remember. One of them is my password manager's master passphrase (5 misspelled-and-with-random-punctuation words). The others include stuff like my work and home laptop/disk passwords, which I can't autofill, my 3 important ba…

I mostly agree, but I do find myself choosing a new FDE and login passphrases about once a year, and I wish that I could choose these using something like Diceware, but memorable enough that I wouldn't need to write them down at all. Thinking about how I might do that is what ultimately led to this post.

Re: Entropy isn't sufficient to measure password strength

#20
post #18

When will we stop using passwords?! They are an elementary school kid “secret club” game taken way, way too far. They are totally broken. Nobody can come up with and remember good passwords. Nobody can store passwords securely. 100% busted. Instead of continuing to debate what makes a good password, we need to put our energy into better techniques altogether! No more shared secrets! Let’s talk about one-time codes, a…

The US Government thought they were bad, and got rid of them. In 2004 (Thanks George W. Bush!)
Post reply on HN