Link to the actual talk (why didn't op just link to the talk?) maybe, instead of linking to the website of a "security software" company with ties to the FSB? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpouLO-GXLo
Because a written summary is nice for people who want to read and might not be in a place where they can watch a video / listen to a talk?
This is a pretty low effort click-driving blog post though IMO - 'someone did a thing' - I linked 'someone's' ('Sick Codes'') original post on the 'thing' below.
Modern large scale farming is really not that much different from other industrial endeavors. Increasingly, small farms have to sell out to the industrial farms due to the economics.
More like "farm equipment manufacturers have insecure backoffice web services" with some tenuous and unsubstantiated highly contrived links to fanciful action movie sub-plots. I agree that automotive and farm equipment have generally mediocre security track records and that, with the addition of remote connectivity, these issues are concerning. But all hyperbole and breathless reporting like this gains us is an excus…
Not just repair hostility: especially JD sought to wall in their garden a decade or so ago. They went all-in on Canbus/SAE J1939 and used the proprietary word spec to keep out other manufacturers of ag automation. I worked at Trimble Navigation during that time, remember it well. Most manufacturers were still using direct hydraulic controls then. Not JD. Evidently things have just got worse since.
You seem to be saying electronic controls are bad. Why?
More like "farm equipment manufacturers have insecure backoffice web services" with some tenuous and unsubstantiated highly contrived links to fanciful action movie sub-plots. I agree that automotive and farm equipment have generally mediocre security track records and that, with the addition of remote connectivity, these issues are concerning. But all hyperbole and breathless reporting like this gains us is an excus…
Not just repair hostility: especially JD sought to wall in their garden a decade or so ago. They went all-in on Canbus/SAE J1939 and used the proprietary word spec to keep out other manufacturers of ag automation. I worked at Trimble Navigation during that time, remember it well. Most manufacturers were still using direct hydraulic controls then. Not JD. Evidently things have just got worse since.
Isn't using J1939 just an example of them embracing an industry standard? That stuff is everywhere now, right?
Not just repair hostility: especially JD sought to wall in their garden a decade or so ago. They went all-in on Canbus/SAE J1939 and used the proprietary word spec to keep out other manufacturers of ag automation. I worked at Trimble Navigation during that time, remember it well. Most manufacturers were still using direct hydraulic controls then. Not JD. Evidently things have just got worse since.
You seem to be saying electronic controls are bad. Why?
They are not innately bad, but they are implemented in a bad way. A system of hydraulic control lines cannot be locked behind copyright. They can be physically fixed. A cracked manifold can be welded or replaced. But when fixing a modern electronic system you must have the permission of the manufacturer before replacing a part, or even opening some boxes. Any mechanic can see leaking hydraulic fluid. But modern electronic systems can require special/expensive tools just to read the error code telling you which part has failed.
is an excuse for repair hostility under the guise of "security." That's what every other company has been trying to do too, not just farm equipment manufacturers. If you look between the lines you'll find that the "security industry" is largely in favour of corporate-authoritarianism. Thankfully, not everyone is stupid, and I suspect farmers are actually more likely to spot the BS.
> If you look between the lines you'll find that the "security industry" is largely in favour of corporate-authoritarianism. If you're looking for some unreasonably secure device, obviously you have to bake an apple pie from scratch in order to ensure no steps in your supply line are tampered with. Current system has plenty of problems with which that's being used as a defense though, and the fact that those systems…
I think, reasonably secure would already be enough. Not even that level is reached.
Link to the actual talk (why didn't op just link to the talk?) maybe, instead of linking to the website of a "security software" company with ties to the FSB? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpouLO-GXLo
Because a written summary is nice for people who want to read and might not be in a place where they can watch a video / listen to a talk?
Link to the actual talk (why didn't op just link to the talk?) maybe, instead of linking to the website of a "security software" company with ties to the FSB? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpouLO-GXLo
I’m still fascinated how some people believe “ties to FSB” are somehow different from ties to NSA.
You seem to be saying electronic controls are bad. Why?
They are not innately bad, but they are implemented in a bad way. A system of hydraulic control lines cannot be locked behind copyright. They can be physically fixed. A cracked manifold can be welded or replaced. But when fixing a modern electronic system you must have the permission of the manufacturer before replacing a part, or even opening some boxes. Any mechanic can see leaking hydraulic fluid. But modern elect…
Next up: John Deere invents a hydraulic rights managment (HRM) system that implements a communication protocol between hydraulic components using high frequency pressure changes in the hydraulic lines. These signals are interpreted by mechanical/hydraulic processing units to p̵r̵e̵v̵e̵n̵t̵ ̵t̵a̵m̵p̵e̵r̵i̵n̵g̵ ̵w̵i̵t̵h̵ ensure the quality of the product.