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What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

drewdevault.com

11–20 of 211 posts

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#11
Here are the major past threads. Others?

Gemini's "uselessness" is its killer feature - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27490769 - June 2021 (193 comments)

Gemini Space - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26670464 - April 2021 (27 comments)

Agate, a simple Gemini server written in Rust - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26401158 - March 2021 (34 comments)

Beyond the Web: Gopher, Gemini, and the Rise of the Small Internet - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26359454 - March 2021 (5 comments)

gemini:// space - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25986378 - Feb 2021 (170 comments)

The Tragedy of Gemini - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25807633 - Jan 2021 (28 comments)

Hacker News over Gemini - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25225810 - Nov 2020 (21 comments)

Show HN: Taurus – A Concurrent Gemini Server - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25045130 - Nov 2020 (5 comments)

A Gopher View of Gemini - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25005307 - Nov 2020 (9 comments)

A look at the Gemini protocol: a brutally simple alternative to the web - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23730408 - July 2020 (347 comments)

Castor: A browser for the small internet (Gemini, Gopher, Finger) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23161922 - May 2020 (75 comments)

Gemini – A new, collaboratively designed internet protocol - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23042424 - May 2020 (62 comments)

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#12
I understand the desire to use trust-on-first-use to get rid of certificate authorities (some of the most dispicable and untrustworthy organizations around, and the largest security hole in TLS). However trust-on-first-use basically hands any long-term man-in-the-middle a complete victory. Authoritarian regimes are going to require ISPs to mitm every connection from first use, and hand over whatever data is desired to the secret police.

CAA, Key Pinning, certificate transparency all bring the risk of CA abuse way down without opening a huge new vector of ISP abuse.

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#13

I don't quite get this... it sounds like the author mostly has issues with the HTML part of the web, but much of this seems to focus on the HTTP part.... why not keep http and just make a replacement for HTML? Writing an http server is very simple, too

HTTP supports extensibility via HTTP headers and methods.

Gemini to not be evolved:

* HTTP is now for interactivity, complex clients, WebGL, Webassembly, ...

* Gemini is for a segregated simpler web: links and text.

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#14

I'm a bit annoyed with the lack of _some_ inline image support. but making a browser for gemini is really really easy at least.

lagrange has inline images. it doesn't prefetch them, but when you click an image link they get displayed inline.

https://github.com/skyjake/lagrange (not affiliated)

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#15
post #2

It's like Gopher, but dumber.

Gopher was my intro to the internet. Coming from BBSs it was very natural. I loved Gopher and I am happy to see it's ideology progress to the next evolutionary step. I am aware that that the protocol still exists, but I'm hoping Gemini can bring back the desire for text content. I don't ever want to watch a video of a solution that can be written down in 3 lines.

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#16

I understand the desire to use trust-on-first-use to get rid of certificate authorities (some of the most dispicable and untrustworthy organizations around, and the largest security hole in TLS). However trust-on-first-use basically hands any long-term man-in-the-middle a complete victory. Authoritarian regimes are going to require ISPs to mitm every connection from first use, and hand over whatever data is desired t…

Trust on first use combined with preloaded public key lists is the best of both worlds in my opinion. You may say that browsers made in authoritarian countries would sabotage the preload lists, but they could also bundle illegitimate CAs or break HTTPS in other ways anyway.

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#17

I understand the desire to use trust-on-first-use to get rid of certificate authorities (some of the most dispicable and untrustworthy organizations around, and the largest security hole in TLS). However trust-on-first-use basically hands any long-term man-in-the-middle a complete victory. Authoritarian regimes are going to require ISPs to mitm every connection from first use, and hand over whatever data is desired t…

People, or businesses, that you know in real life could exchange certificate hashes in person.

This is one of those things that usually garners the response "normal people would never do that", but honestly I'm surprised that no-one has even tried.

Let's say that web browsers put a short hash of the certificate right in the URL bar. Amazon, for example, could print its hash on every shipping box. Banks could print their hashes on plaques in every branch. Newspapers on their, well, newspapers. Media organizations could occasionally add them to their TV logos and radio jingles. And so on. There's any number of out-of-band channels available.

For most sites, you actually wouldn't need to verify the hash anyway. You usually wouldn't care. But when you did care, I honestly think this isn't such a crazy idea.

Re: What is this Gemini thing, and why am I excited about it? (2020)

#20
post #16

I understand the desire to use trust-on-first-use to get rid of certificate authorities (some of the most dispicable and untrustworthy organizations around, and the largest security hole in TLS). However trust-on-first-use basically hands any long-term man-in-the-middle a complete victory. Authoritarian regimes are going to require ISPs to mitm every connection from first use, and hand over whatever data is desired t…

Trust on first use combined with preloaded public key lists is the best of both worlds in my opinion. You may say that browsers made in authoritarian countries would sabotage the preload lists, but they could also bundle illegitimate CAs or break HTTPS in other ways anyway.

This. Some standards bodies (arguably) made a big deal about client certificates some time ago to reliably pin client identities for client->server connections (whether it worked is a different story), and I certainly think having functionality for the reverse (pinning server identities) should exist too.

Doesn't have to be Gemini even, but I think getting buy in from browser vendors after the removal of HPKP is going to be a problem...

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