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My understanding is that they will log you under specific law enforcement request. It’s very different from saying they automatically log everyone.
In the discussion of their fulfilling the request, the data they provided was described as the IP during account creation. If that was accurate then it is a neat trick that law enforcement knew which accounts would eventually be of interest.
My understanding is that they will log you under specific law enforcement request. It’s very different from saying they automatically log everyone.
In the discussion of their fulfilling the request, the data they provided was described as the IP during account creation. If that was accurate then it is a neat trick that law enforcement knew which accounts would eventually be of interest.
My understanding is that they will log you under specific law enforcement request. It’s very different from saying they automatically log everyone.
Not really different, since it's binary. The message used to be "we don't keep IP logs" and now it's the opposite.
I'd be willing to bet 99% of services that say they don't log your IP, actually log your IP in some form. You're telling me all these companies just discard webserver logs? No chance.
What are some good alternatives?
https://fediverse.party/ Peer to peer services with encrypted communications are impossible to centrally control and monitor.
Regardless, they are not suitable replacements for email.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
In the discussion of their fulfilling the request, the data they provided was described as the IP during account creation. If that was accurate then it is a neat trick that law enforcement knew which accounts would eventually be of interest.
I dmed Andy Yen and he assured me they only start logging after requests, can you link me to your source?
"They therefore sent a requisition (via EUROPOL) to the Swiss company managing the messaging system in order to find out the identity of the creator of the address. ProtonMail responded to this request by providing the IP address and the fingerprint of the browser used by the collective."
It looks like the Swiss police responded to a request that could not be fulfilled (creator's ip) by getting something ~equally good (most recent ip) through asking protonmail to enable IP monitoring and the resulting report shown redacted on TC looks like a normal subpoena response where the data was already available.
This does not really look like the back and forth seen with authorities first trying to request the impossible in a subpoena (i.e. famously from lavabit but also from any cloud provider) but that level of adversarial ~obstruction through precise compliance might not be possible in Swiss law.