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US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

zdnet.com

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Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#11
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So that users can be at home or on a mobile device without requiring them to have VPN. But so that you still can ensure data-locality or run a customised instance e.t.c. if you have requirements around that. Plus licensing is approx. 40% of the full SaaS cost at scale so may be cheaper to deploy that way.

But why are they not using VPN?

For the same reason docker exists. Convenience and lack of understanding.

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#12
post #6
post #4

I am not in the least bit shocked. Atlassian products are some of the worst glued-together garbage in the industry. The entire product surface area is probably rife with exploits. Using Confluence or Jira will show you just how much Atlassian cares about its own products. I'd love for this to be the straw that breaks the camel's back and makes IT/infosec orgs move away from this bilge.

Any suggestions on what to use instead of Confluence? Need to run on-prem, it's mostly the wiki-like features I'm interested in.

What target group? Devs? Po? General org?

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#13
post #6
post #4

I am not in the least bit shocked. Atlassian products are some of the worst glued-together garbage in the industry. The entire product surface area is probably rife with exploits. Using Confluence or Jira will show you just how much Atlassian cares about its own products. I'd love for this to be the straw that breaks the camel's back and makes IT/infosec orgs move away from this bilge.

Any suggestions on what to use instead of Confluence? Need to run on-prem, it's mostly the wiki-like features I'm interested in.

I migrated every confluence instance over to XWiki, since the Australian backdoor law[1].

http://www.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Main/WebHome

https://xwiki.com/en/try-xwiki/

[1] https://www.wired.com/story/australia-encryption-law-global-...

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#14
post #5

Why are internally hosted instances even available on the public internet?

For those that believe in the zero trust model, don't all apps and services become exposed to the public internet?

They are generally exposed through a proxy that sits in between. If you don't authenticate, you can't send a request to it at all.

(This is opposed to the lazy model, where your aplication is fully exposed to the web and you click log in and it redirects to SSO - if there is a vulnerability that doesn't require authentication you're already compromised)

The proxy will handle sign in and passes traffic to/from the webserver backend, and you should not be able to send a single HTTP request to the underlying application without the proxy capturing authentication and who the user that sent the request was.

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#15
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So that users can be at home or on a mobile device without requiring them to have VPN. But so that you still can ensure data-locality or run a customised instance e.t.c. if you have requirements around that. Plus licensing is approx. 40% of the full SaaS cost at scale so may be cheaper to deploy that way.

But why are they not using VPN?

Probably because they’re on a mobile device or essentially monitoring 24/7 would be my guess.

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#16
My employer was bit by this on Wednesday. Thankfully we had Crowdstrike on it which blocked any real damage. But it definitely moved our cloud migration from “later this year” to “later this month”.

Also, not having confluence for a day exposed just how reliant we were on it for day-to-day activities.

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#17

My employer was bit by this on Wednesday. Thankfully we had Crowdstrike on it which blocked any real damage. But it definitely moved our cloud migration from “later this year” to “later this month”. Also, not having confluence for a day exposed just how reliant we were on it for day-to-day activities.

> Thankfully we had Crowdstrike on it which blocked any real damage

For someone not familiar with their products, what did they do for you specifically?

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#18
post #5

Why are internally hosted instances even available on the public internet?

Because you might need it to share documentation with customers. Confluence isn't just for external documentation.

Confluence, at it's core, is just a wiki. Sometimes it needs to be available online, sometimes it really doesn't.

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#19
The linked proof-of-concept [1] demonstrates bypassing the OGNL blacklist by using this to do reflection:

> ""["class"].forName(...)

as opposed to:

> "".getClass().forName(...)

Does anyone know why this works in OGNL? It does not appear to be valid Java syntax.

[1] https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/main/Confluence-RC...

Edit: Oh apparently, it's just a feature of OGNL: https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/language-guid...

Re: US Cybercom says mass exploitation of Atlassian Confluence vulnerability ongoing

#20
post #17

My employer was bit by this on Wednesday. Thankfully we had Crowdstrike on it which blocked any real damage. But it definitely moved our cloud migration from “later this year” to “later this month”. Also, not having confluence for a day exposed just how reliant we were on it for day-to-day activities.

> Thankfully we had Crowdstrike on it which blocked any real damage For someone not familiar with their products, what did they do for you specifically?

For us specifically they blocked the server from downloading more assumedly dangerous tools. Blocked more privilege escalation and blocked crypto mining software from running.

Our teams were also able to do a “network isolation” and essentially bring the server offline quickly, without touching more pieces and possibly exposing our credentials or tokens.

We also had the paid Overwatch protection which is Crowdstrikes 24/7 security monitoring solution which resulted in an actual person emailing half our team at 1am letting us know this was happening and their recommended remediation steps.

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