The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S. • Hacker News Board

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#11

Post by p_l » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 12:38 AM UTC

iab wrote: post #9

lumost wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Much of the testing is due to refining designs to make them more efficient, smaller, and lighter. If the Ukraine decided to build a bomb that wasn't state of the art they could be reasonably assured that it would work, but substantially less clear on final yield. Yield only really matters in theory and for planning MAD. Tank divisions are equally destroyed with a 100 kiloton device as a 10 megaton device.

But as a deterrent, you would need this to be reasonably accurate, yes?

Why? All you really care is whether the boom is big enough, and that you can deliver it on target. The latter was a big reason for optimising bomb construction, but you can just as well optimise your launchers - which leads to missiles like R-36, where the main difference between it and a space launcher is replacing the payload. Yes, early USA ICBMs also serve as base for space launches, but unlike R-36 were much less storable (except for Titan, iirc) and less powerful.

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#12

Post by neartheplain » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 12:39 AM UTC

iab wrote: post #9

lumost wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Much of the testing is due to refining designs to make them more efficient, smaller, and lighter. If the Ukraine decided to build a bomb that wasn't state of the art they could be reasonably assured that it would work, but substantially less clear on final yield. Yield only really matters in theory and for planning MAD. Tank divisions are equally destroyed with a 100 kiloton device as a 10 megaton device.

But as a deterrent, you would need this to be reasonably accurate, yes?

If we're talking about devices with megaton or hundred-kiloton yields, accuracy isn't super important. And simpler, unminiaturized weapons are probably going to be bomber-dropped anyway.

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#13

Post by chitowneats » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 1:06 AM UTC

chitowneats wrote: post #3

I would love to read this (presumably excellent) article, but this horrible javascript monstrosity of a website has inexplicably disabled my ability to navigate the page with my j key.

To be more clear, it seems they've disabled the native browser scrolling via javascript.

I have wrist strain issues so I have a programmable keyboard. I don't use a mouse to scroll and click, I use a layer on my keyboard. I don't map the arrow keys or page up/page down because they generally aren't useful. I literally have to change my setup to scroll on the page. I imagine there are others in need of even more specialized equipment than mine that is broken by this implementation.

I have yet to find a good reason when developing a webpage to reimplement scroll. Certainly not for a fancy progress bar which is presumably the reason this was done. This is a legitimate accessibility concern.

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#14

Post by willis936 » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 1:27 AM UTC

iab wrote: post #8

willis936 wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Probably the same way that nations that previously tested nuclear weapons currently develop nuclear weapons: with supercomputers and ICF facilities. Making a bomb isn't very tricky. The nuclear bomb tests were a combination of learning physics and threatening adversaries. The understanding of making nuclear weapons doesn't see significant benefit from blowing up more bombs. The physics is freely available. The gist o…

I think there is a large discrepancy between hypothetically viable, and demonstrably viable.

The designs are demonstrably viable. Hundreds of nukes were detonated unnecessarily to prove this point. Nations don't need to make new designs. Gun and super designs are common knowledge.

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#15

Post by boomboomsubban » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 1:30 AM UTC

PEJOE wrote: post #7

boomboomsubban wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Ignoring countries that obviously flaunt it, NK & Iran When has Iran flaunted it? Three countries have made tests ignoring the treaty. North Korea, India, and Pakistan, all non-signatory states.

Also one of: France, Israel, and or South Africa [0], of whom the latter two were signatories to the 1963 agreement. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vela_incident

I should have specified the 96 treaty, as both the USSR and USA have violated the 1963 agreement as well. Still no violations by Iran though.

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#16

Post by MomoXenosaga » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 2:10 AM UTC

willis936 wrote: post #14

iab wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think there is a large discrepancy between hypothetically viable, and demonstrably viable.

The designs are demonstrably viable. Hundreds of nukes were detonated unnecessarily to prove this point. Nations don't need to make new designs. Gun and super designs are common knowledge.

If you want to be on the UN Security council you need to detonate a nuke somewhere in a desert. It's a requirement.

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#17

Post by dragonwriter » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 2:14 AM UTC

MomoXenosaga wrote: post #16

willis936 wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The designs are demonstrably viable. Hundreds of nukes were detonated unnecessarily to prove this point. Nations don't need to make new designs. Gun and super designs are common knowledge.

If you want to be on the UN Security council you need to detonate a nuke somewhere in a desert. It's a requirement.

> If you want to be on the UN Security council you need to detonate a nuke somewhere in a desert.

No, you don’t.

Every UN member rotates through UNSC seats. If you want a permanent Security Council seat, you need to be or be generally recognized successor in interest to one of five powers that got those seats after WW2, when only one had detonated nuclear weapons (and the important one were on Japanese cities, not desert.)

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#18

Post by hammock » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 2:20 AM UTC

boomboomsubban wrote: post #15

PEJOE wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Also one of: France, Israel, and or South Africa [0], of whom the latter two were signatories to the 1963 agreement. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vela_incident

I should have specified the 96 treaty, as both the USSR and USA have violated the 1963 agreement as well. Still no violations by Iran though.

Iran doesn't have the nuclear bomb, as far as we know (?)

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#19

Post by boomboomsubban » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 2:26 AM UTC

hammock wrote: post #18

boomboomsubban wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I should have specified the 96 treaty, as both the USSR and USA have violated the 1963 agreement as well. Still no violations by Iran though.

Iran doesn't have the nuclear bomb, as far as we know (?)

Iran has never really had much of an active nuclear weapons program, despite the media coverage. That's why I object to claims they violated testing treaties.

Re: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the U.S.

#20

Post by [deleted] » Wed, Jun 09, 2021, 3:00 AM UTC

willis936 wrote: post #14

iab wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think there is a large discrepancy between hypothetically viable, and demonstrably viable.

The designs are demonstrably viable. Hundreds of nukes were detonated unnecessarily to prove this point. Nations don't need to make new designs. Gun and super designs are common knowledge.

[deleted]