> Feminism has the same PR problem as veganism: They're granfalloons.
Are feminism and veganism granfalloons?
I'm not sure the definition of granfalloon even makes sense. I get the humour and the wisdom of granfalloonery... but where does it leave us?
How is the clustering of people who share a common characteristic, such as an interest or an origin, "meaningless"? It depends on what you mean by meaninglessness. If we defer to the notion of Shannon information, the association of people who share an ideal or a belief is not random, is it? So it must have meaning?
Maybe yes and maybe no. It depends on what you measure, and what you consider to be meaningful.
A room full of feminists, like a room full of vegans, do have at least one thing in common. Getting these people together in a room increases the possibility that they might organise to act in a way that furthers the advancement of their group interest. That seems like it could fit the definition of meaningfulness, does it not?
Still, the insight of labelling these as granfalloons serves to highlight that on any other measure or criteria, the same people might have nothing in common, and might well be adversarial or counterproductively affiliated.
So, a roomful of vegans might also comprise half a roomful of Democrats, and half a roomful of Republicans, right? On diet, they reinforce. But on politics, they cancel out. Is that the wisdom of granfalloonery? I'm not entirely sure, but in the matter of feminism, post Beauvoir, we can see fragmentation, which is the classical dilemma of the movement as a political force. All feminists are not all alike on all measures, and just being feminists is not enough to get a roomful of them to agree to agree on anything.
At the Super Bowl, one of them might root for the Patriots, and the other for the Giants, right? That's the absurdist dimension of the meaninglessness of their clustering. But is that the most salient aspect of their interests?
Amy Coney Barret is not the same as Ruth Bader Ginsberg. The notion that humans of their gender are entitled to serve on the supreme court bench is an ideal of feminism. It does not follow that one woman is substitutable for another woman, just because of her gender. But to exclude people from the supreme court on the basis of gender is to throw out an entire class of people that cuts across all categories of ideology, interest, aesthetics, dietary practice, race, religion and culture. That we can see that now is testament to the work that Beauvoir did to open up our understanding of classifications of people to the nuance of gender.