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The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

plato.stanford.edu

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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#11

Post by michaelmrose »

mLuby wrote: post #8
DanielleMolloy wrote: post #5

Please let me apologize for the lack of understanding, maybe someone can add to this: If biological intelligence works like a Turing machine, is it even possible to know what or how certain brain areas compute without simulating them bottom-up? Question is influenced by this idea originally from the 80s: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_irreducibility

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

I don't think the idea that the brain can do anything a sufficiently fast computer can't deserves any credence. Those who argue this point always descend into hand wavy nonsense.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#12

Post by ethn »

mikorym wrote: post #10
joe_the_user wrote: post #2

It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…

I think a Turing Machine is an infinite state automaton with the capability that you can remotely access state information. [1] Maybe someone can clarify whether this is correct. If you phrase it that way, then it seems more intuitive that the brain could be described as a Turing machine. The definition of a Turing machine is deceivingly simple and cause us to question what we perceive of as complex. The transition f…

This is correct w.r.t the formalization of Minsky.

Further, there is a conflation among models and implementation from the parent commenter. Minsky propounds in his automaton theory that a machine may be implemented in any way and it is only its formal history of signals and responses to states which determine the machine. In this sense a biological machine made of organic bases can be considered the same to that of gears and another of semi-conducting transistors assuming their states are described by the same histories.

More so, in the same automaton theory any environment which interacts with a machine in itself must be a machine by symmetry. The classification of each is arbitrary for consideration of the states you’re interested in.

The author of the article remains correct as we must be able to model at least one faculty of the mind as Turing complete because we can also compute by the nature of computation itself. This remains useful as then we can project the guarantees of a Universal Turing machine onto that specific faculty of the mind which is Turing complete. This then allows us to explore those novel guarantees of the mind, those which are also of the Universal Turing Machine since by that faculty having the properties of UTM, it is to be considered a UTM, as opposed to having no guarantees.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#13

Post by kaffeemitsahne »

joe_the_user wrote: post #2

It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…

It might seem like basic materialism, but a lot of philosophers suddenly loose their simple and clear-cut ontological stance as soon as the mind gets involved.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#14

Post by 0xBA5ED »

michaelmrose wrote: post #11
mLuby wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

I don't think the idea that the brain can do anything a sufficiently fast computer can't deserves any credence. Those who argue this point always descend into hand wavy nonsense.

If by computer, you mean a binary computer using transistors, there's no reason to think you can make it do anything a brain can do. Alternatively, if computer means any hypothetical hardware, it may very well end up looking like a brain, in which case you might just call it an artificial brain rather than a computer.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#15

Post by mikorym »

mikorym wrote: post #10
joe_the_user wrote: post #2

It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…

I think a Turing Machine is an infinite state automaton with the capability that you can remotely access state information. [1] Maybe someone can clarify whether this is correct. If you phrase it that way, then it seems more intuitive that the brain could be described as a Turing machine. The definition of a Turing machine is deceivingly simple and cause us to question what we perceive of as complex. The transition f…

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finite-state_machine

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#16

Post by disem_brane »

michaelmrose wrote: post #11
mLuby wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

I don't think the idea that the brain can do anything a sufficiently fast computer can't deserves any credence. Those who argue this point always descend into hand wavy nonsense.

And how about you make the case for silicon becoming self aware or having subjective experience without descending into hand wavy nonsense?

Primates, which are very similar to us, do not have a comparable subjective experience. We know that because we can communicate with them and they don't have that much to say.

There are also brains in other animals that share a lot of similarities and are larger than ours.

Yet no beings (that's were aware of) have a subjective experience as rich as humans or can self-referentially communicate about that experience.

But turn up the clock speed on my gaming rig far enough and I get to debate the meaning of existence with it?

You have to ignore so much that is obvious to come to a reductive, materialistic conclusion like that.

[Edit]

Not sure if it's worth adding this but I do think we can build a computer that passes the Turing test. I also believe (sooner rather than later) we'll have a Siri-like AI that will provide enough companionship that a relationship can be formed with it.

We could even teach that AI to discuss subjective experience in a believable way.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#18

Post by taneq »

yters wrote: post #17

How can such a theory be falsified?

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#19

Post by mathgenius »

mLuby wrote: post #8
DanielleMolloy wrote: post #5

Please let me apologize for the lack of understanding, maybe someone can add to this: If biological intelligence works like a Turing machine, is it even possible to know what or how certain brain areas compute without simulating them bottom-up? Question is influenced by this idea originally from the 80s: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_irreducibility

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

> things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot

You say this as though we understand what "thinking" is. We do not.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#20

Post by antonvs »

michaelmrose wrote: post #11
mLuby wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

I don't think the idea that the brain can do anything a sufficiently fast computer can't deserves any credence. Those who argue this point always descend into hand wavy nonsense.

It depends what you my mean by "do anything".

If that includes "have a conscious experience," then you're the one who's going to have to descend into hand wavy nonsense to explain how that's possible. Unless you've solved the hard problem of consciousness.

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