A report on Chinese digital surveillance and hacking of Uyghurs
11–14 of 14 posts
Re: A report on Chinese digital surveillance and hacking of Uyghurs
#12The exploit itself is 22,963 bytes of code and if successful will ultimately result in the forced download of a file name loader to the /data/data/com.android.browser directory of the victim device How can a website force download a file to a device? Seems like a browser vulnerability
> The exploit itself is 22,963 bytes of code and if successful will ultimately result in the forced download of a file name loader to the /data/data/com.android.browser directory of the victim device
The way you quoted is unreadable on mobile, and difficult to read on desktop (scrolling). It is meant for max 80 chars blocks of programming text.
Re: A report on Chinese digital surveillance and hacking of Uyghurs
#13I am gonna have to call BS on this report. Everyone knows that google including gmail is blocked in China, so why would they try to get a hold of their google oauth? Additionally, I just went onto one of the mentioned websites at random, turkistantimes.com and guess what, the site is hosted in the America, in Houston! So either that Xinjiang province is not behind the great firewall, or that Xinjiang has far greater…
> However, as the sites listed in this post are actually blocked in China, it can be seen that the Uyghur diaspora around the world are also primary targets of these digital surveillance operations. These operations can be used to track the movements of Uyghurs outside of China and spy on those they are communicating with.
Re: A report on Chinese digital surveillance and hacking of Uyghurs
#14The exploit itself is 22,963 bytes of code and if successful will ultimately result in the forced download of a file name loader to the /data/data/com.android.browser directory of the victim device How can a website force download a file to a device? Seems like a browser vulnerability
Please quote properly, like this: > The exploit itself is 22,963 bytes of code and if successful will ultimately result in the forced download of a file name loader to the /data/data/com.android.browser directory of the victim device The way you quoted is unreadable on mobile, and difficult to read on desktop (scrolling). It is meant for max 80 chars blocks of programming text.