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Slack Security Incident

keybase.io

11–20 of 110 posts

Re: Slack Security Incident

#11
As people are discussing Keybase for teams and whatnot - could anyone comment on Keybase for individuals, families, etc?

My family are debating moving to Matrix (and away from iMessage). I had briefly debates Keybase due to some interesting features. Anyone have experience with Keybase for families and individuals?

Re: Slack Security Incident

#13

Wow - for a sales pitch fantastic. Many of these security issues leave you little to actually do. This write up provides an alternative. What’s super bad here is slack misleading about the cause wasting all the users time. Quick question, anyone use key base - can u give a quick review? Team currently use slack

I have used it in conjunction with Slack; a channel for infrastructure team members to share sensitive details, or to direct message secrets to people. It works well for that light usage.

I cannot imagine replacing Slack with it for all company or team communication though. It's not remotely polished enough.

Re: Slack Security Incident

#14

As people are discussing Keybase for teams and whatnot - could anyone comment on Keybase for individuals, families, etc? My family are debating moving to Matrix (and away from iMessage). I had briefly debates Keybase due to some interesting features. Anyone have experience with Keybase for families and individuals?

Why move away from iMessage? It's end-to-end encrypted.

Re: Slack Security Incident

#17
> Keybase messages are end-to-end encrypted, and only our users control their decryption keys.

End-to-end encryption isn't just good for the users because the service can't access the messages and sell them, it's also good for the users as it provides good protection if the service gets hacked: message content can't leak unless the attackers can change client code.

Re: Slack Security Incident

#18
The second I read this, I immediately signed up to Keybase today and deleted my Slack account and switched to the Keybase chat system instead which I am setting up right now.

I am confident to say that this incident was the final nail in the coffin for me to abandon Slack. Choosing Keybase was a no brainer.

Re: Slack Security Incident

#19
post #10

The author would have done well by refraining from using this as an opportunity to make a sales pitch for their startup, as it detracts from an otherwise important message. Let me see if I have this right: Slack had a major security breach in 2015. Apparently someone installed malicious code that could even read password inputs in plaintext. They waited 4 years, after growing large and going public, to inform affecte…

Would shareholders have a case to make for fraud here? Slack clearly didn't want this information getting out pre-IPO, as a security disclosure in this case would certainly impact public confidence in the company.

Re: Slack Security Incident

#20
Let's ignore the rather awkward self promotion, and the fact that 2FA would have prevented this specific incident.

This is the important part, which everyone should think about:

> What would have been way worse — immeasurably worse — is if our team had used Slack for anything other than what we did use it for, which was discussing outages of our own product. Had my cofounder and I discussed our company's cap table, or business partnerships, or compensation agreements, or ongoing legal matters over Slack; or had our team traded API keys, or security-sensitive matters; or had we controlled mission-critical infrastructure via Slack-powered "bots"; we'd be sweating bullets to this day that our important company secrets were out in the open, about to resurface at the worst possible time.

I see Slack being used for everything at a lot of companies.

There are a lot of interesting things in the chat history everywhere: SSH/API keys, logins and passwords, sensitive internal documents, chatops bots that would let one take control of the infrastructure, and worst of all - juicy office affair gossip.

Combine this with often lax user management (forgetting to disable old accounts, inviting people to channels they shouldn't be in, ...).

Most companies overlook this and don't even have a policy for what's OK to post on Slack, and what isn't. Not even to dream of any kind of enforcement.

I'ts a big security problem, even without Slack getting compromised, and should be on the radar for CTOs.

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