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DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

blog.mozilla.org

11–20 of 301 posts

Re: DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

#11

pretty cool, I wished chrome did that. firefox is probably going to choose cloudflare (1.1.1.1). I wonder how this plays out with local DNS (e.g. my ISP has some custom domains for me to use, and internal company network addresses)

You can set firefox to use the normal DNS as a fallback

Re: DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

#12
post #4

I hadn't been paying much attention to DNS-over-HTTPS, but I recently listened to a talk that Dr. Paul Vixie (of BIND fame) gave that where DNS-over-HTTPS was discussed: https://youtu.be/OxFFTxJv1L4?t=2799 After hearing Dr. Vixie discuss DNS-over-HTTPS from a network operator perspective I'm a lot more wary of the protocol.

His main argument seems to be that the network operator should have control over DNS requests for safety reasons. Control and monitoring. This is the antithesis of privacy and encryption. I wouldn't be surprised if he was pro http over https either.

Because they should!

Think a corporate network. If I as a sysadmin set our DHCP options to give out our own resolvers, I expect that every machine on the domain to use ours.

DoH breaks that completely; and hence the network operator should have the final say.

As a sysadmin myself, if browsers are overriding the basic model of top down, and it hurts me, because when something is wrong, I cant just look on my machine, I have to check which browser they use... that is the antithesis of the problem, because when DoH doesn't work but normal DNS does, then I'm flat out of options.

This is why I choose not to use Firefox or any of the DoH mainline providers (Cloudflare,) and I go out of my way to make sure users cant do it.

Re: DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

#14

I hadn't been paying much attention to DNS-over-HTTPS, but I recently listened to a talk that Dr. Paul Vixie (of BIND fame) gave that where DNS-over-HTTPS was discussed: https://youtu.be/OxFFTxJv1L4?t=2799 After hearing Dr. Vixie discuss DNS-over-HTTPS from a network operator perspective I'm a lot more wary of the protocol.

(full disclosure: I'm affiliated to Cloudflare, but opinions here are my own of course)

Thanks for posting this. I knew Paul is against DoH, but never understood his specific arguments. He has great comment about DoT (dns over TLS) couple of minutes before the linked youtube (I agree with him on that).

Personally I'm not an "owner" of the networks I'm connecting to. My home router is managed by my ISP, I don't run pi-hole. Network at work is managed by yet-someone-else. I often use my mobile carrier (LTE tethering), and often use WiFi at coffee shops.

For all of these cases I would prefer to not expose my DNS traffic. Heck, I'm 100% sure that my dns traffic today is being re-sold! I have couple of unique domain names that I have open in my browser which have unique and non-guessable DNS names, which are crawled by some bots today. Even though I never shared them in any way with anyone! The only way they could be exposed for crawling is by my DNS provider leaking the DNS traffic to some shady third-party.

Many DNS people are opposed DoH, but I think this train has passed. As a user of the internet I really do want encrypt everything these days. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8404

If my corporate boss, or my ISP can mine less data about the malware I'm running - so be it. For me this is an acceptable cost of measurably improved privacy.

Re: DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

#15
post #12
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

His main argument seems to be that the network operator should have control over DNS requests for safety reasons. Control and monitoring. This is the antithesis of privacy and encryption. I wouldn't be surprised if he was pro http over https either.

Because they should! Think a corporate network. If I as a sysadmin set our DHCP options to give out our own resolvers, I expect that every machine on the domain to use ours. DoH breaks that completely; and hence the network operator should have the final say. As a sysadmin myself, if browsers are overriding the basic model of top down, and it hurts me, because when something is wrong, I cant just look on my machine,…

A corp network should set up their own DoH resolver anyway. And/or simply install a cert on their workstations and MITM every TLS connection.

Even better corps should only allow TLS that they can successfully MITM.

It's basic security. If the endpoint/host can do whatever due to lack of firewall/enforcement, then it doesn't really matter what the network operator wants.

Re: DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

#16
post #15
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because they should! Think a corporate network. If I as a sysadmin set our DHCP options to give out our own resolvers, I expect that every machine on the domain to use ours. DoH breaks that completely; and hence the network operator should have the final say. As a sysadmin myself, if browsers are overriding the basic model of top down, and it hurts me, because when something is wrong, I cant just look on my machine,…

A corp network should set up their own DoH resolver anyway. And/or simply install a cert on their workstations and MITM every TLS connection. Even better corps should only allow TLS that they can successfully MITM. It's basic security. If the endpoint/host can do whatever due to lack of firewall/enforcement, then it doesn't really matter what the network operator wants.

[deleted]

Re: DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

#19
post #14

I hadn't been paying much attention to DNS-over-HTTPS, but I recently listened to a talk that Dr. Paul Vixie (of BIND fame) gave that where DNS-over-HTTPS was discussed: https://youtu.be/OxFFTxJv1L4?t=2799 After hearing Dr. Vixie discuss DNS-over-HTTPS from a network operator perspective I'm a lot more wary of the protocol.

(full disclosure: I'm affiliated to Cloudflare, but opinions here are my own of course) Thanks for posting this. I knew Paul is against DoH, but never understood his specific arguments. He has great comment about DoT (dns over TLS) couple of minutes before the linked youtube (I agree with him on that). Personally I'm not an "owner" of the networks I'm connecting to. My home router is managed by my ISP, I don't run pi…

Your ISP doesn't really need DNS traffic to know things about you, IP addresses alone leak a lot of information, add to that SNI, response sizes, active probing, clear text traffic, etc. and you should realize that the only thing DoH does is letting one extra party to know what you are doing in addition to your ISP. DoH is net negative for privacy. You need at least a VPN to get to net positive, so that your ISP can't get that much data.

Re: DNS-over-HTTPS Policy Requirements for Resolvers

#20
post #15
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because they should! Think a corporate network. If I as a sysadmin set our DHCP options to give out our own resolvers, I expect that every machine on the domain to use ours. DoH breaks that completely; and hence the network operator should have the final say. As a sysadmin myself, if browsers are overriding the basic model of top down, and it hurts me, because when something is wrong, I cant just look on my machine,…

A corp network should set up their own DoH resolver anyway. And/or simply install a cert on their workstations and MITM every TLS connection. Even better corps should only allow TLS that they can successfully MITM. It's basic security. If the endpoint/host can do whatever due to lack of firewall/enforcement, then it doesn't really matter what the network operator wants.

> A corp network should set up their own DoH resolver anyway

What good is that is the browser uses their own list? Literally that's what the article is saying. Firefox will force users to use ones that break the top-down approach on how software works. If I set a DHCP option for DoH, and setup my own DoH resolver, Firefox wont care, they will jsut use their list.

This also opens up possibilities for selling positions on the trusted list, because we've seen that happen before (adblock, or the firefox Mr Robot extension.)

Firefox itself, with plays like this are trying to make a decision about the whole, when they are completely forgetting the corporate side.

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