Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
11–20 of 36 posts
Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#12The PDF has no introduction section, seems to be aimed at people who already know what it's talking about. Can anyone shed some light on what is the idea here? I honestly don't understand what's going on, apart from that it seems to be some security-related feature (or actually two of them?)
pledge is seccomp
Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#13http://www.bsdcan.org/2018/schedule/events/968.en.html
Video should eventually show up on YouTube.
[0] https://twitter.com/bob_beck/status/1005162340956794880 ;-)
Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#14These are the slides from Bob Beck (beck@'s) talk at BSDCan 2018 (Jun 8-9th), apparently missing its first page.. [0] http://www.bsdcan.org/2018/schedule/events/968.en.html Video should eventually show up on YouTube. [0] https://twitter.com/bob_beck/status/1005162340956794880 ;-)
https://www.openbsd.org/papers/florian_slaacd_bsdcan2018.pdf
Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#15Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#16The PDF has no introduction section, seems to be aimed at people who already know what it's talking about. Can anyone shed some light on what is the idea here? I honestly don't understand what's going on, apart from that it seems to be some security-related feature (or actually two of them?)
pledge is seccomp
pledge() can also be found in over 85% of OpenBSD's base system.
Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#17Earlier quoted context omitted.
pledge is seccomp
Not really; seccomp(2) is for _specific_ system calls, pledge(2) is for more broad functionalities.
Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#18Given the Chrome example starting on page 6, here's my guess as to how pledge and unveil will contain Chrome to e.g. protect SSH keys. First, 3 of the 5 Chrome processes are already pledged to disallow filesystem reads. The two remaining ones (RenderProcess and UtilityProcess) can be unveiled to allow directories like
* ~/.config/chromium
* ~/.cache/chromium
* ~/Downloads
* /tmp
* and anything important I don't know of
Additionally, if unveil works like pledge and can be further restricted after e.g. reading files into memory, unveils can then be undone. Anyone know if the following would work to first allow access to /tmp and then revoke that access? unveil("/tmp", "rw");
/* do some work */
unveil("/tmp", "");Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#19Awesome! Given the Chrome example starting on page 6, here's my guess as to how pledge and unveil will contain Chrome to e.g. protect SSH keys. First, 3 of the 5 Chrome processes are already pledged to disallow filesystem reads. The two remaining ones (RenderProcess and UtilityProcess) can be unveiled to allow directories like * ~/.config/chromium * ~/.cache/chromium * ~/Downloads * /tmp * and anything important I do…
Re: Pledge and Unveil in OpenBSD [pdf]
#20Earlier quoted context omitted.
pledge is seccomp
Not at all, for example you can't implement the ratcheting down semantics of pledge() using seccomp. Say starting with a broader promise set "stdio rpath recvfd", and then dropping to "stdio" after full init. pledge() can also be found in over 85% of OpenBSD's base system.