Live data from Hacker News

Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

cse.umich.edu

11–20 of 52 posts

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#11
post #8

It is one of the curious facts of modern culture that the people who love technology the most also seem to be the most opposed to electronic voting. I think it's because the people who most understand how computers work also understand that no data can be considered trustworthy if somebody else has been in possession of the hardware. Yet governments continue to trust the impossible promises of the people who make vot…

I've often considered open source voting software and hardware as a possible startup idea, but frankly I don't have the balls to go through with it. I'm not an entrepreneur, and it is a legal minefield besides, so I stay away. Still, I have some neat (IMHO) ideas, so maybe I should find a venue in which to express them.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#12
post #8

It is one of the curious facts of modern culture that the people who love technology the most also seem to be the most opposed to electronic voting. I think it's because the people who most understand how computers work also understand that no data can be considered trustworthy if somebody else has been in possession of the hardware. Yet governments continue to trust the impossible promises of the people who make vot…

I think the issue is the difficulty of auditing electronic votes. Computers and databases have made it so easy to forge data--just look at Bernie Madoff.

The best way to ameliorate these discomforts is to ensure that a list of eligible voters is made available every year (already available under the current system), as well as a list and sum total of those eligible that voted. We would need to assign every voter a UUID every time he votes, and provide the voter a printed receipt of the UUID and selected choices (if desired) on security paper (controlled stock of security paper with its own unique identifier to be accounted for), and publish all election results with the selected choices matched to a UUID on a website every year in CSV and HTML formats.

I'm sure there will always be ways to tamper the system. The key is that if every one is able to watch the system (like open source code auditing), the risk of discrepancies or error is minimized. The UUID will allow the voter to confirm that his choices match the recorded results.

If this system were implemented, it would be better than the status quo. The current system may seem better, but it's prone to human error (Scantrons not being scanned by an optical reader; hanging chads; etc).

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#13
post #8

It is one of the curious facts of modern culture that the people who love technology the most also seem to be the most opposed to electronic voting. I think it's because the people who most understand how computers work also understand that no data can be considered trustworthy if somebody else has been in possession of the hardware. Yet governments continue to trust the impossible promises of the people who make vot…

I don't know that we're opposed to it in theory, it's just that every single implementation thus far has been terrifically bad. Making the code open source would go a long way, I think, as would establishing open working groups to establish security standards. I may be an optimist, but I do believe that theoretically (at least information-theoretically[1]), it can be done well. [1] http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q…

It's also fairly easy for us techies to grasp the hacking of computer systems. But we often forget how insecure and error prone paper systems can also be:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJfj9ySYg0Q

Massive voter fraud could be happening every election - it's pretty easy to vote fraudulently and there is almost no way to find out after the fact (I've done it unintentionally). For whatever reason, we are insanely afraid of hackers pushing an election over the edge, and yet we don't even ask for photo ID at the voting booth.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#14
post #8

It is one of the curious facts of modern culture that the people who love technology the most also seem to be the most opposed to electronic voting. I think it's because the people who most understand how computers work also understand that no data can be considered trustworthy if somebody else has been in possession of the hardware. Yet governments continue to trust the impossible promises of the people who make vot…

I think the issue is the difficulty of auditing electronic votes. Computers and databases have made it so easy to forge data--just look at Bernie Madoff. The best way to ameliorate these discomforts is to ensure that a list of eligible voters is made available every year (already available under the current system), as well as a list and sum total of those eligible that voted. We would need to assign every voter a UU…

At least two obvious ways to hack your proposed system. Hackers could just add phony UUID/vote pairs to the totals. Activists could claim their vote was stolen if their preferred candidate loses.

(We already saw a variant of the latter in 2000. Remember "I couldn't follow the arrow and accidentally voted buchanan"?).

Further, if a person's vote is verifiable, it also opens the door to paying people for their votes.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#15
post #8

It is one of the curious facts of modern culture that the people who love technology the most also seem to be the most opposed to electronic voting. I think it's because the people who most understand how computers work also understand that no data can be considered trustworthy if somebody else has been in possession of the hardware. Yet governments continue to trust the impossible promises of the people who make vot…

I don't know that we're opposed to it in theory, it's just that every single implementation thus far has been terrifically bad. Making the code open source would go a long way, I think, as would establishing open working groups to establish security standards. I may be an optimist, but I do believe that theoretically (at least information-theoretically[1]), it can be done well. [1] http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q…

I do not. As long as the hardware has been in possession of untrusted parties (and polling place workers do not count as trusted) any software solution can be compromised.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#17
post #3

Now make it so you have to eat the ghost labeled as the candidate you want to vote for, and it records the vote. I might actually go to the polls.

Alternatively, a 1 minute quiz on the constitution and/or your countries system of governance. Get all the answers right and you can vote!

That would require improving public education first.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#18
post #5
post #2

"We received the machine with the original tamper-evident seals intact. The software can be replaced without breaking any of these seals, simply by removing screws and opening the case." Ouch. Incompetence doesn't even begin to describe it. Or is this by design?

"What's inside the AVC Edge? It has a 486 SLE processor and 32 MB of RAM—similar specs to a 20-year-old PC. The election software is stored on an internal CompactFlash memory card. Modifying it is as simple as removing the card and inserting it into a PC." Seems to be a history of dubious competence for this machine and company: http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:vVOdcOpBZ_EJ:w... http://sourcewatch.org/index.…

I'm not too shocked by the use of the processor, that may very well have something to do with reliability. You'd be surprised how demanding industry is in this respect, and it's not rare at all to find what you'd class as 'ancient' hardware when it comes to doing jobs where you have to make the results reliable. Not saying that was the case here, but it could be, also I'm imagining these boards might be run from a battery backed-up power supply so they may want to have them consume as little power as possible (that's a guess though, but I can imagine that if your election is in an area where there is a power failure you don't want to lose the results).

Compare for instance with avionics and stuff on space flights. If crashing is not an option the rules about hardware change dramatically. It's a pity the article does not say whether the ram was ECC ram or not, that would be a hint that this is not just a way to be 'cheap'.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#19
post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know that we're opposed to it in theory, it's just that every single implementation thus far has been terrifically bad. Making the code open source would go a long way, I think, as would establishing open working groups to establish security standards. I may be an optimist, but I do believe that theoretically (at least information-theoretically[1]), it can be done well. [1] http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q…

I do not. As long as the hardware has been in possession of untrusted parties (and polling place workers do not count as trusted) any software solution can be compromised.

I'm not convinced that any method will ever be 100% foolproof, but I think it can be improved immensely, and if we could limit the inaccuracies/fraud to always be less than those incurred by a traditional paper ballot[1], I think I'd approve.

In regards to your comment regarding untrusted parties handling the hardware, here are a few counterpoints:

- We already trust polling place workers with paper ballots, the possibility for fraud already exists.

- The potential for fraud from any one polling place can be limited by implementing a system which makes it impossible (or very very difficult) to spoof the location from which a vote was cast, and ensuring that the number of votes cast per polling place is within an expected range.

- Such a system could also include a paper receipt with an ID number on it. A voter could plug this "tracking number" in on a trusted website (ie. vote.gov) and confirm that their name is associated with their preferred candidates, but not allow them to change these choices. This would go a long way towards identifying fraudulent activity when/if it occurs.

[1] Though figuring out how to quantify this is anybody's guess.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#20
post #3

Now make it so you have to eat the ghost labeled as the candidate you want to vote for, and it records the vote. I might actually go to the polls.

Alternatively, a 1 minute quiz on the constitution and/or your countries system of governance. Get all the answers right and you can vote!

I don't even need knowledge, just basic reasoning skills--I would prefer to have anybody who can answer a question about, say, the base rate fallacy[1] voting, even if they don't know the constitution. Hell, even if they're illiterate.

[1] http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=12

Post reply on HN