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Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

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Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#11

Well, in many cases AES keys are used one time, and there's also forward secrecy that guards it from decryption even if the key leaked.

Forward secrecy does not protect the data for which the key was leaked (which could be at-rest data), it only protects future transmissions.

Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#12
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

...how about a random-power-consumer? would it help?

Generally mitigations like adding random things only delay attacks like this, they don't prevent them. Like adding random timings won't prevent timing attacks, adding random sized strings won't prevent chosen plaintext or padding attacks, etc...

Wonder if you can hash the cryto algorithm.

Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#13
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

...how about a random-power-consumer? would it help?

No, not at all. A raised SNR can be overcome in almost all circumstances by making more measurements, i.e. correlation, since noise is not correlated, it is removed. For the same reason random delays don't help against timing attacks.

Perhaps you could quantize the level.

Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#14
post #12
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Generally mitigations like adding random things only delay attacks like this, they don't prevent them. Like adding random timings won't prevent timing attacks, adding random sized strings won't prevent chosen plaintext or padding attacks, etc...

Wonder if you can hash the cryto algorithm.

This was even tested with CTR and GCM (I know this for a fact), which were not a problem at all. Surprisingly GCM was somewhat easier than hashing modes. But also CBC was detectable after a few blocks.

Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#15
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

...how about a random-power-consumer? would it help?

No, not at all. A raised SNR can be overcome in almost all circumstances by making more measurements, i.e. correlation, since noise is not correlated, it is removed. For the same reason random delays don't help against timing attacks.

Not if you calculate keys nonstop, then have another machine pick from a huge list later.

Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#17
I read it a few times and still don't understand how you can get like the 4k of private key data or whatever it is out of a radio signal - and they don't even mention keys they're talking about the algorithm itself.

Totally don't get it in the slightest.

Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#19
Are there any modern crypto algorithms that are, by design, immune from an attack such as this? Would not having any key-dependent code paths be sufficient to prevent this attack?

If it is possible to be immune by design to power analysis, timing and tempest attacks, is there a list of such algorithms somewhere that I can look it up? My google-fu hasn't returned anything useful.

Re: Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]

#20
post #19

Are there any modern crypto algorithms that are, by design, immune from an attack such as this? Would not having any key-dependent code paths be sufficient to prevent this attack? If it is possible to be immune by design to power analysis, timing and tempest attacks, is there a list of such algorithms somewhere that I can look it up? My google-fu hasn't returned anything useful.

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