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After CIA leak, Intel Security releases detection tool for EFI rootkits

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Re: After CIA leak, Intel Security releases detection tool for EFI rootkits

#11
post #6

No amount of EFI rootkit detection will ever remove the possibility that malicious code is running inside the Intel Management Engine (ME), because code inside the ME would run side-by-side with the bootloader and with unlimited permissions. Unless Intel provides source code for the ME, it is impossible to 100% know whether unauthorized code is running.

Even if Intel gave you the source code, you still wouldn't know if there was any unauthorised code running.

Re: After CIA leak, Intel Security releases detection tool for EFI rootkits

#12
post #6

No amount of EFI rootkit detection will ever remove the possibility that malicious code is running inside the Intel Management Engine (ME), because code inside the ME would run side-by-side with the bootloader and with unlimited permissions. Unless Intel provides source code for the ME, it is impossible to 100% know whether unauthorized code is running.

Even if Intel gave you the source code, you still wouldn't know if there was any unauthorised code running.

Reproducible builds is a very important part of knowing you are secure, and in the absence of that at least being able to flash on your own compilation.

Re: After CIA leak, Intel Security releases detection tool for EFI rootkits

#14
post #6

No amount of EFI rootkit detection will ever remove the possibility that malicious code is running inside the Intel Management Engine (ME), because code inside the ME would run side-by-side with the bootloader and with unlimited permissions. Unless Intel provides source code for the ME, it is impossible to 100% know whether unauthorized code is running.

Even if Intel gave you the source code, you still wouldn't know if there was any unauthorised code running.

[deleted]

Re: After CIA leak, Intel Security releases detection tool for EFI rootkits

#16
Finally some tools for this. Very good. Would this be the first reasonably doable method for extracting all the blobs? Seem like it must be a well-needed foundation to build on for security companies.

But...

  We recommend generating an EFI whitelist after
  purchasing a system or when you are sure it has
  not been infected
Not that I have a better suggestion, but with interdicted shipments and other vulnerable points along the supply chain before a system is in the care of its owner, it doesn't exactly seem like a sure bet that it's clean on arrival. How would one otherwise be "sure it has not been infected"? Any feasible ways?

Next step would be to provide lists of known good signatures from some controlled environment, or at least a consensus system to know whether the version one finds matches the version others have?

Re: After CIA leak, Intel Security releases detection tool for EFI rootkits

#17
post #7
post #2

And what if intel is compromised? Mass rootkit installation!

Of all the attacks a nation state could do, surely finding a few talented people to get PhDs in the appropriate fields and go to work at Intel and collect a paycheck along with a nice stipend from the nation state is likely among the easiest.

Why bother with employees - just go give money to intel to do this. Intel as a system is designed to produce chips that work a certain way, and my understanding is that said system is rather good at what it does, dedicating the time and energy of many rather smart people to making sure things work the way they're supposed to. Why risk throwing a monkey wrench into such a system when you can just point it in a different direction?

AT&T and Verizon don't have 'plant' employees. Much simpler - and legally, safer - to just give the bag of money straight to the corporation.

Re: After CIA leak, Intel Security releases detection tool for EFI rootkits

#20
post #5
post #2

And what if intel is compromised? Mass rootkit installation!

You can reverse engineer the EFI modules, build a whitelist based on known safe code, and then detect subversion at Intel, so this is not a good strategy for serious adversaries.

In theory, sure. Is it sufficiently simple that people will do it in practice? (I don't know, I expect you would know)

Wouldn't the malicious alterations introduced in a scenario like that most likely be exploitable defects that could be explained away as mistakes? If they accumulate too much around certain people that's suspicious of course, but it seems like it would often be difficult to downright prove that someone intentionally broke the security of a rather complex system.

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