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Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

blackhat.com

11–20 of 34 posts

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#11
Does anyone know where the Blackhat 2016 videos will be posted? I've always found them incredibly educational.

Okay I'll leave something behind as well. This is my favorite sec-conference video of all time: [HOPE X] Elevator Hacking: From the Pit to the Penthouse https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOzrJjdZDRQ Closely followed by DEF CON 18 - Joseph McCray - You Spent All That Money and You Still Got Owned... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SsUeWYoO1Y

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#12
post #10

Am I understanding correctly that while they enumerate a list of potentially useful attack vectors, there are no actual attacks (yet)? Of course, since the Year of Snowden, I now assume that any "theoretical" attack vector has a Team, a Project Manager, and a half-completed Kanban board somewhere deep in the NSA…

> Am I understanding correctly that while they enumerate a list of potentially useful attack vectors, there are no actual attacks (yet)?

Hard to say. The sorts of people who are capable of finding these kinds of exploits don't advance their careers by publishing.

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#13
post #7

One day, a blackhat presentation is actually going to be a new PDF attack vector, and we'll all be doomed.

PDF viewers, browsers, web servers, office products, and mobiles are very common targets for exploit development.

However, most vulnerabilities in these applications are simply too valuable to announce to the world. They are generally purchased by offensive cyber operations companies or the government before they could be explained at e.g. Blackhat.

This is one reason it's crucial to have bug bounties. Apple can easily pay more than say, Endgame. If they bought exploits in the same fashion and at the same price point as the defense industry, their security posture would improve tremendously.

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#14

Does anyone know where the Blackhat 2016 videos will be posted? I've always found them incredibly educational. Okay I'll leave something behind as well. This is my favorite sec-conference video of all time: [HOPE X] Elevator Hacking: From the Pit to the Penthouse https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOzrJjdZDRQ Closely followed by DEF CON 18 - Joseph McCray - You Spent All That Money and You Still Got Owned... https://www…

+1 to elevator hacking. I ended up watching several versions as each one had a few different but entertaining tidbits.

Deviant Ollam also has quite a few other interesting talks.

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#15
post #10

Am I understanding correctly that while they enumerate a list of potentially useful attack vectors, there are no actual attacks (yet)? Of course, since the Year of Snowden, I now assume that any "theoretical" attack vector has a Team, a Project Manager, and a half-completed Kanban board somewhere deep in the NSA…

If I'm reading the last few slides correctly, the tl;dr is something like:

- They haven't found any actual attacks.

- Because the secure enclave runs so little code, there's very little attack surface in software, and much of what there is (mainly message passing between the secure and normal environments) seems solid. The only likely possibility is the wrapper code around IMG4.

- However, if there is an exploit in IMG4, there aren't many mitigation techniques (stack canaries, ASLR) built in, so it would be likely to succeed (again, conditional on there actually being an exploit)

- Attacking hardware might be possible, but mainly on older devices, because the >= A8 chips have extensive protection against side-channel and power analysis attacks.

- One "game over" possibility would be blocking the "fuse signal" that tells the CPU that the secure enclave has been compromised. This would allow for replay attacks. However, this would require extremely capable hardware for both analyzing the chip lines and actually performing the attack. If it's possible at all, it would definitely be restricted to NSA-like scenarios.

They do conclude that the iPhone security features seem "light-years ahead of competitors" (their words), and coming from a Blackhat presentation, that actually means something.

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#17
post #6

The paper mentions standard methods of attack, such as glitching voltage and/or clock. Does anyone want to comment on how feasible it would be to defend against stuff like that in both hardware and software? E.g. in software, instead of just storing an address in memory, store a tuple. Something like (address, ~address). Validate each tuple on use, i.e. (address ^ ~address) must result in all bits set. That's obvious…

In software it is very difficult to "protect" against. The goal with glitching is simply two switch a 1 to a 0 somewhere (conditional branch, memory store, etc). No mater how many extra if statements and bits you set, your not going to get all of them. And the attacker can just glitch twice. Remember, your not causing the memory to go funky, your messing with the processors reads from registers and cache. So if the n…

If you need to cause glitches in a few precisely chosen moments in time, while _not_ causing glitches in some other moments in time between the former, it gets a lot harder. It gets even harder if the response to a wrong sequence of glitches is to brick the processor / erase storage.

There are also known reasonably good defenses against glitches in PC that involve checking at every end of a basic block that a subset of instructions of this block has executed.

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#19
post #13
post #7

One day, a blackhat presentation is actually going to be a new PDF attack vector, and we'll all be doomed.

PDF viewers, browsers, web servers, office products, and mobiles are very common targets for exploit development. However, most vulnerabilities in these applications are simply too valuable to announce to the world. They are generally purchased by offensive cyber operations companies or the government before they could be explained at e.g. Blackhat. This is one reason it's crucial to have bug bounties. Apple can easi…

The comment surely meant a scenario where the presentation file itself, claiming to tell us about something else, happens to be a PDF exploit that attacks the audience of readers, not that the presentation is about such a vulnerability.

Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]

#20

Does anyone know where the Blackhat 2016 videos will be posted? I've always found them incredibly educational. Okay I'll leave something behind as well. This is my favorite sec-conference video of all time: [HOPE X] Elevator Hacking: From the Pit to the Penthouse https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOzrJjdZDRQ Closely followed by DEF CON 18 - Joseph McCray - You Spent All That Money and You Still Got Owned... https://www…

"Speaker presentations and materials are put online generally two weeks after the event. Audio and video are generally available 6-9 months after the conference." [1]

[1] https://www.blackhat.com/html/archives.html

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