Okay I'll leave something behind as well. This is my favorite sec-conference video of all time: [HOPE X] Elevator Hacking: From the Pit to the Penthouse https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOzrJjdZDRQ Closely followed by DEF CON 18 - Joseph McCray - You Spent All That Money and You Still Got Owned... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SsUeWYoO1Y
Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
11–20 of 34 posts
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#12Am I understanding correctly that while they enumerate a list of potentially useful attack vectors, there are no actual attacks (yet)? Of course, since the Year of Snowden, I now assume that any "theoretical" attack vector has a Team, a Project Manager, and a half-completed Kanban board somewhere deep in the NSA…
Hard to say. The sorts of people who are capable of finding these kinds of exploits don't advance their careers by publishing.
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#13One day, a blackhat presentation is actually going to be a new PDF attack vector, and we'll all be doomed.
However, most vulnerabilities in these applications are simply too valuable to announce to the world. They are generally purchased by offensive cyber operations companies or the government before they could be explained at e.g. Blackhat.
This is one reason it's crucial to have bug bounties. Apple can easily pay more than say, Endgame. If they bought exploits in the same fashion and at the same price point as the defense industry, their security posture would improve tremendously.
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#14Does anyone know where the Blackhat 2016 videos will be posted? I've always found them incredibly educational. Okay I'll leave something behind as well. This is my favorite sec-conference video of all time: [HOPE X] Elevator Hacking: From the Pit to the Penthouse https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOzrJjdZDRQ Closely followed by DEF CON 18 - Joseph McCray - You Spent All That Money and You Still Got Owned... https://www…
Deviant Ollam also has quite a few other interesting talks.
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#15Am I understanding correctly that while they enumerate a list of potentially useful attack vectors, there are no actual attacks (yet)? Of course, since the Year of Snowden, I now assume that any "theoretical" attack vector has a Team, a Project Manager, and a half-completed Kanban board somewhere deep in the NSA…
- They haven't found any actual attacks.
- Because the secure enclave runs so little code, there's very little attack surface in software, and much of what there is (mainly message passing between the secure and normal environments) seems solid. The only likely possibility is the wrapper code around IMG4.
- However, if there is an exploit in IMG4, there aren't many mitigation techniques (stack canaries, ASLR) built in, so it would be likely to succeed (again, conditional on there actually being an exploit)
- Attacking hardware might be possible, but mainly on older devices, because the >= A8 chips have extensive protection against side-channel and power analysis attacks.
- One "game over" possibility would be blocking the "fuse signal" that tells the CPU that the secure enclave has been compromised. This would allow for replay attacks. However, this would require extremely capable hardware for both analyzing the chip lines and actually performing the attack. If it's possible at all, it would definitely be restricted to NSA-like scenarios.
They do conclude that the iPhone security features seem "light-years ahead of competitors" (their words), and coming from a Blackhat presentation, that actually means something.
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#16Wonder on the FIPS-140-2 level, where this chip would fit?
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#17The paper mentions standard methods of attack, such as glitching voltage and/or clock. Does anyone want to comment on how feasible it would be to defend against stuff like that in both hardware and software? E.g. in software, instead of just storing an address in memory, store a tuple. Something like (address, ~address). Validate each tuple on use, i.e. (address ^ ~address) must result in all bits set. That's obvious…
In software it is very difficult to "protect" against. The goal with glitching is simply two switch a 1 to a 0 somewhere (conditional branch, memory store, etc). No mater how many extra if statements and bits you set, your not going to get all of them. And the attacker can just glitch twice. Remember, your not causing the memory to go funky, your messing with the processors reads from registers and cache. So if the n…
There are also known reasonably good defenses against glitches in PC that involve checking at every end of a basic block that a subset of instructions of this block has executed.
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#18Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#19One day, a blackhat presentation is actually going to be a new PDF attack vector, and we'll all be doomed.
PDF viewers, browsers, web servers, office products, and mobiles are very common targets for exploit development. However, most vulnerabilities in these applications are simply too valuable to announce to the world. They are generally purchased by offensive cyber operations companies or the government before they could be explained at e.g. Blackhat. This is one reason it's crucial to have bug bounties. Apple can easi…
Re: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor [pdf]
#20Does anyone know where the Blackhat 2016 videos will be posted? I've always found them incredibly educational. Okay I'll leave something behind as well. This is my favorite sec-conference video of all time: [HOPE X] Elevator Hacking: From the Pit to the Penthouse https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOzrJjdZDRQ Closely followed by DEF CON 18 - Joseph McCray - You Spent All That Money and You Still Got Owned... https://www…