Live data from Hacker News

Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

yubico.com

11–20 of 114 posts

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#11
In discussions like this the phrase "security by obscurity" gets used as an accusation. We all agree "security by obscurity" does not work. But that's not what is happening here.

Wikipedia's definition: "the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main method of providing security for a system or component of a system."

Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keeping the source code secret.

They say they are increasing the security by things like this: disabling user-loading of new firmware (which could be a bad actor loading bad firmware), using hardware with built-in side-channel countermeasures, and disabling JTAG ports (which could be used for key extraction).

This isn't obscurity. These are some good engineering arguments. Engineering is always full of trade-offs.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#13
I've studied high-assurance security and hardware for a long time. This looks to be motivated by a few things:

1. Hardware cost money to develop, has to make it back, and is easy to clone. They'll keep hardware secret by default for this reason like everyone does. Also lowers odds of patent suits. All kinds of people demand open, secure hardware but almost nobody will buy it. Just like software. Number 1 problem in the INFOSEC industry.

2. There's three companies IIRC building the kinds of secure IC's they need. They NDA the stuff critical to understanding it. Plus, the implementations are secret with tamper-resistance mechanisms. Pointless relying on open-source model to understand or evaluate such a thing. Some marginal benefits but major risks would still be there. Whereas, open-sourcing the stuff adds risk in terms of issues with the suppliers. So, no OSS is an acceptable choice here.

3. Restricting some of the firmware/software is a tradeoff of the protection methods they're using. Again, reduces value in open-sourcing it as you'd have to dump it off the chip to verify it anyway. The kind of people that can do that don't need Yubico's help.

4. Yubico might not know how to build secure HW/SW combos. It's a rare skill whose techniques are a mix of published and trade secrets. Plus, attackers are always coming up with new stuff. So, obfuscation... not security by obscurity... but obfuscation of aspects of design to increase work of attackers between product releases is both justified and a proven method. If no other measures exist, then it would be the garbage known as security by obscurity. This seems to be better practice of proven mechanisms plus obfuscation which can hamper even nation-state hackers. Who knows how good their mechanism are going to be but there's potential.

So, it seems like a combination of sustaining their business by stopping clones and lawsuits with improved branding from effects of obfuscation & hardened IC's on low-skilled attacks that dominate the press. Two, very-good reasons to make a decision in this market. It's just economics in action. :)

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#14

In discussions like this the phrase "security by obscurity" gets used as an accusation. We all agree "security by obscurity" does not work. But that's not what is happening here. Wikipedia's definition: "the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main method of providing security for a system or component of a system." Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keepin…

[deleted]

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#15

> we, as a product company The most important thing any security company needs to realize is that their primary product is their reputation, not the physical or digital goods that they produce. "We, as a product company" is totally the wrong attitude. There's really no question about it, every ounce of closed source software/hardware in a security offering is something the customer should be concerned about it. From…

"The most important thing any security company needs to realize is that their primary product is their reputation, not the physical or digital goods that they produce."

That's semi-true. They're both important. The belief that the product is worth buying and effort into selling it are primary importance. Getting hacked or sued in public diminishes sales. So, the most important aspect of security for these kinds of companies is perversely minimizing potential for their image to be hit by hackers even if the products have no security. Not an accusation at Yubico but a common strategy in this market. So, they just have to present a good impression to target market.

" every ounce of closed source software/hardware in a security offering is something the customer should be concerned about it."

Not really. It might surprise you but many companies have run for decades on proprietary platforms. They generated ridiculous sums of money in the process. All kinds of people got jobs, made money, and retired in this time. Nothing to worry about apparently most of the time. The reasons to worry are there but smaller than you think. One must balance many needs in a business. For most, this kind of thing is a checklist item about reducing liability. They're fine if it looks good on paper.

" But would you buy a cheap knockoff Yubikey? I certainly wouldn't. "

Most would. They want something as an obstacle to hackers while minimizing cost. They don't know if Yubikey has any real quality underneath given how businesses often do things. So, it's a real Yubikey vs a cheaper one. Many, not all, will choose the cheaper one. See Cisco and mobile manufacturers vs Huwei to see how big of a market share that can lead to.

"Confidence that when they buy from company X they know that company X has put the best engineers to the task and crafted a device that will protect their valuable digital information."

There's a market for that. I used to try to serve it. It's tiny and fickle. Yet, I question what confidence people have in those engineers to begin with as they've never assessed their capabilities in INFOSEC and strong attacks rarely are publicized. It's not like Googling rate of car crashes.

" produce world class hardware and software, and charge a sharp premium on it, because security is _so_ important and protects some of our most valuable assets. "

Many tried. Market rejected almost all of it. Still does. They want security-defeating feature X, protocol Y, and fall-back Z. They want it to run as fast as competition despite security or safety checks on insecure, potentially-backdoored hardware to get COTS HW benefits. They also don't want to pay hardly anything extra for it despite whole teams of extra people being put into every other component for rigor and price of external evaluations. Market for high-assurance guards is so small that they have to charge over $100,000 per unit to make the money back. Hell, Signal is free and Threema charges $1-2 but they're barely a fraction of 1% of WhatApp or Facebook in marketshare. Demand-side is the problem.

So, Yubico is doing what's good for business. All of them are and should until market shows it's willing to make the compromises necessary for strong security. They won't. So, wasting money on it is foolish outside defense sector, academia, and a few niches (eg smartcards) where one can keep a job doing it.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#16
Simply put, all things equal, the device will be reverse engineered and exploited sooner by well funded governments than a hacker collective.

Even worse, you won't know when the device becomes obsolete. So you might be buying an insecure solution from the start.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#18

In discussions like this the phrase "security by obscurity" gets used as an accusation. We all agree "security by obscurity" does not work. But that's not what is happening here. Wikipedia's definition: "the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main method of providing security for a system or component of a system." Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keepin…

>They say they are increasing the security by things like this: disabling user-loading of new firmware (which could be a bad actor loading bad firmware), using hardware with built-in side-channel countermeasures, and disabling JTAG ports (which could be used for key extraction).

Are all of those listed features only possible with secret code? And if yes, once someone unobscures the code or methods, they'll be able to defeat the security. Isn't that the exact definition of 'security through obscurity'?

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#19

> we, as a product company The most important thing any security company needs to realize is that their primary product is their reputation, not the physical or digital goods that they produce. "We, as a product company" is totally the wrong attitude. There's really no question about it, every ounce of closed source software/hardware in a security offering is something the customer should be concerned about it. From…

"The most important thing any security company needs to realize is that their primary product is their reputation, not the physical or digital goods that they produce." That's semi-true. They're both important. The belief that the product is worth buying and effort into selling it are primary importance. Getting hacked or sued in public diminishes sales. So, the most important aspect of security for these kinds of co…

>>Cisco and mobile manufacturers vs Huwei to see how big of a market share that can lead to.

Implying the Huawei is the "cheap knock off" and Cisco/Apple/Samsung/etc are the noble high quality product fighting the good fight....

My Hauwei Nexus 6P has been the best phone I have ever owned, far exceeding the quality and usability of every Motorola, Samsung, and other phones I have owned.

As to Cisco, after their fasco with the NSA I would not trust them at all for security.

Post reply on HN