This is just a public service announcement: depending on implementation of a standard hierarchical wallet, leaking a list of public addresses and a _single_ private key can leak unlimited forward private keys, especially if the public addresses are sequentially generated ones. This was true for some implementations of BIP32, for instance. I don't know if blockcypher's wallet is vulnerable to this attack, but it's not…
Wallet author here, thanks @vessenes for the comment. Yes, as with all HD wallets, an attacker with a single private key and the the extended public key can derive all child private keys. You can read more about that aspect of HD wallets in this blog post here ( https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/deterministic-wallets-a... ). What's important to keep in mind, is that the child keys never leave your computer. In fac…
I think the attack vector that seems very likely here is an e-mail like this:
User: Initiates Support Request around a transaction that's funky
Naughty BlockCypher Employee: "Let's try to debug this. Can you get me a private key from an early address you sent from, one which you WON'T USE AGAIN? I want to check that we're doing our math correctly. Make sure it's not an address with an existing balance!"
I propose that well over 99% of developers would think "Will I use this address again? If not, should be fine to pass on this private key."