Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
11–20 of 34 posts
Re: Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
#12Did the author of the article submit his findings to the Tor Project?
I'm sure at least one developer of the Tor project reads hacker news. EDIT: Far more interesting is the author's most recent article.... wtf http://jcarlosnorte.com/security/2016/03/06/hacking-tachogra...
Re: Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
#13Did the author of the article submit his findings to the Tor Project?
I'm sure at least one developer of the Tor project reads hacker news. EDIT: Far more interesting is the author's most recent article.... wtf http://jcarlosnorte.com/security/2016/03/06/hacking-tachogra...
Re: Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
#14Re: Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
#15Lots of ideas, many of which I've had as well, but I am missing conclusions. On the demo page it tells me my CPU benchmark and some scrolling measurements. Great, but how unique was that now? And how are you going to make the data points into a fingerprint? Because next time I scroll, I will totally scroll a millisecond differently.
The "Uber Cookie" is basically a readout of totally random metadata. The CPU benchmark is substantially different each time I run it.
Re: Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
#16Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm sure at least one developer of the Tor project reads hacker news. EDIT: Far more interesting is the author's most recent article.... wtf http://jcarlosnorte.com/security/2016/03/06/hacking-tachogra...
Still, what with responsible disclosure etc.?
Re: Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
#17Did the author of the article submit his findings to the Tor Project?
Re: Advanced Tor Browser Fingerprinting
#18This isn't as strange as he makes it sound, it is done to prevent the link color history attack [1]. Most of the other CSS properties aren't allowed on :active or :visited modifiers.