Someone bought 'Google.com' from Google for one minute

Post by arihant » Thu, Oct 01, 2015, 3:23 AM UTC

rdancer wrote: post #11

christianmann wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

DNS takes a few hours to fully propagate, last time I checked.

That depends on the expiry time ("Time To Live / TTL") set for the particular record. Minimum TTL is 1s, and maximum is 2e32 -1 seconds, or slightly over 136 years[1]. Resolver libraries and daemons keep cached results in volatile memory, so in practical terms, if a high TTL is set, the spoofed result will continue to be used until the given machine is rebooted. For some middle boxes, this can be years. [1] RFC 1035…

Post by _RPM » Thu, Oct 01, 2015, 3:26 AM UTC

rdancer wrote: post #8

0x0 wrote: post #4

What would happen if someone actually managed to move google.com to a non-google registrar account under their control? Would someone step in and just seize it back? Can you imagine the magnitude of client devices hitting the wrong server for gmail,android updates,chrome even for a few minutes?

I can imagine that such an attack would be dealt with a mix of manual intervention and technical measures, something in between the Google.com search page outage that happens once in a blue moon, and the false routes for YouTube.com IPs that have been propagated several times during the past few years. Big companies that rely on Internet presence are quite pro-active, and there are teams of people whose job is to pre…

Post by colechristensen » Thu, Oct 01, 2015, 3:31 AM UTC

_RPM wrote: post #14

rdancer wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can imagine that such an attack would be dealt with a mix of manual intervention and technical measures, something in between the Google.com search page outage that happens once in a blue moon, and the false routes for YouTube.com IPs that have been propagated several times during the past few years. Big companies that rely on Internet presence are quite pro-active, and there are teams of people whose job is to pre…

How exactly would that work. modify an instance of bind and check if the client is requesting to resolve 'google.com'? If true, then respond with the rouge IP? First we must make sure the client machine is set up to use our name servers, the ones we have control over.

Post by tracker1 » Thu, Oct 01, 2015, 3:35 AM UTC

_RPM wrote: post #14

rdancer wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can imagine that such an attack would be dealt with a mix of manual intervention and technical measures, something in between the Google.com search page outage that happens once in a blue moon, and the false routes for YouTube.com IPs that have been propagated several times during the past few years. Big companies that rely on Internet presence are quite pro-active, and there are teams of people whose job is to pre…

How exactly would that work. modify an instance of bind and check if the client is requesting to resolve 'google.com'? If true, then respond with the rouge IP? First we must make sure the client machine is set up to use our name servers, the ones we have control over.

Post by _RPM » Thu, Oct 01, 2015, 3:38 AM UTC

tracker1 wrote: post #18

_RPM wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How exactly would that work. modify an instance of bind and check if the client is requesting to resolve 'google.com'? If true, then respond with the rouge IP? First we must make sure the client machine is set up to use our name servers, the ones we have control over.

You don't even need to setup the client, if you have control over any number of intermediate routers, you can snag/reroute port 53 tcp/udp traffic any way you like. I tend to setup my home router to do this, so that all open dns traffic goes where I tell it to. It's also advised to do so for unauthenticated users on shared/public wifi so that you can provide an agreement page/site. Also, so that unauthenticated users…