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Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

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Re: Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

#4
Thanks to the OP for this link. I just found out why USSR didn't invade Romania (a long time subject of speculation in Romania). We were poor, communists enough, defenseless and not much of a threat. This is so funny when I remember how many naive Romanians thought our army had some "secret weapon " :D (actually we had, it was based on the beans served regularly to the soldiers :D).

Re: Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

#5
Yeah, Viktor Suvorov is pretty interesting writer. This guy was a KGB agent who escaped to the West and published a lot of books. Another his book worth checking out is "Aquarium" - about his path from a spetznaz operator to KGB and then to escape.

Re: Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

#6
> The USSR is not Russia or the Russian Empire; it is not an empire at all.

> The Soviet Union does not need new territory.

> A communist regime cannot feel secure so long as an example of another kind of life exists anywhere near it, with which its subjects can draw comparisons. It is for this reason that any form of Communism, not only the Soviet variety, is always at pains to shut itself off from the rest of the world

This is a massive insight. Most current analysis of Putin centers around a WWII Lebensraum perspective of his actions. Modelling his behavior in terms of neutralizing breakaway territories seems a much better fit.

Re: Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

#7

I read this book many years ago, back when the Soviet Union was still a going concern. A very good read, with some interesting things to say about leadership.

If you don't mind, can you give me a rundown about what it's all about?

Sure.

The first three parts are a rundown of how the Soviet Army was organized at the time of writing (the early 1980s). This part was of great interest then, because reliable information on the Soviet Army was hard to come by in the days of the Iron Curtain, and the author (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Suvorov) was a recent defector. But for today's reader, this part is pretty dull, all tables of organization and maps of military districts. They're all safe to skip.

Part IV ("Mobilisation") departs from the data-dump format of the earlier chapters to talk about how the Soviet Army is organized so that in wartime it can double its number of units overnight, through a system the author calls "invisible divisions." If you wondered how the USSR was able to turn things around after the early disasters following the Nazi invasion in 1941, this chapter will be of interest.

Part V ("Strategy and Tactics") is where the book starts to get really interesting, because here it starts giving you insights into how different the way the Russians looked at war is from the way Western armies do. Part VI ("Equipment") expands on that theme by showing some examples of how that type of thinking informed the way the Soviets designed weapons that became world-famous for their effectiveness, like the AK-47, the T-34 tank, and the Hind helicopter.

Finally, Parts VII ("The soldier's lot") and VIII ("The officer's path") are narrative descriptions of the lives of enlisted conscripts and officers in the Soviet Army.

Overall, I found the book useful because the author's experience in that system taught him a lot of lessons about leadership -- especially leadership in situations where you're expected to achieve impossible things with limited resources and mediocre (at best) people. And the stuff about Soviet strategic thinking and weapons design has lots of interesting things to say about the value of simplicity, reliability and scale over things like feature richness or even user comfort.

These are not arguments you hear a lot from Western writers, so they are a refreshing alternative take. He's writing about weapons, of course, but the arguments are presented in such a fashion that you can easily extrapolate the lessons to really any kind of product.

(I actually referenced one of those lessons in a previous comment on HN, here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5062096)

You don't have to read the book front-to-back to get the good stuff out of it; skip over the early chapters and start at Part V and you'll get all the nutrition with none of the boring, out-of-date tables and charts and maps.

Re: Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

#8

> The USSR is not Russia or the Russian Empire; it is not an empire at all. > The Soviet Union does not need new territory. > A communist regime cannot feel secure so long as an example of another kind of life exists anywhere near it, with which its subjects can draw comparisons. It is for this reason that any form of Communism, not only the Soviet variety, is always at pains to shut itself off from the rest of the w…

I don't see how.

Putin isn't a communist and Western media is widely available in Russia so there is no benefit in regards to information flow in expanding the border. And there is no significant economic difference between Russia and her neighbours, the Soviets were trying to hide the evidence that average people in the West had it better than the new Soviet man.

Putin's actions look much more like those of the 19th century Russian Empire than of the USSR (which never used nationalist rhetoric).

Re: Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

#9

> The USSR is not Russia or the Russian Empire; it is not an empire at all. > The Soviet Union does not need new territory. > A communist regime cannot feel secure so long as an example of another kind of life exists anywhere near it, with which its subjects can draw comparisons. It is for this reason that any form of Communism, not only the Soviet variety, is always at pains to shut itself off from the rest of the w…

Current analysis on the general consumption news is always specious. Usually it's some form of regurgitating whatever the administration says via press release.

The current situation is more like the 19th century "great game". The Ukraine is in Russia's turf, and Putin is all about rebuilding the lost greatness of the nation (while enriching himself & friends as much as possible).

Maneuvering to place the Ukraine under the umbrella of NATO, dominated by the US, or the EU, dominated by Germany, just feeds that message. I don't watch Russian news, but I'm sure the last 6 weeks have been longest victory lap of all time.

People are reverting to WW2 stories because they can't figure out WTF the point of US policy is, and it's easier to say "OMG, Hitler!" than attempt to explain why the Vice President is flying around re-affirming US willingness to go to war with Russia in order to protect Estonia and Latvia.

Re: Inside the Soviet Army (1982)

#10

> The USSR is not Russia or the Russian Empire; it is not an empire at all. > The Soviet Union does not need new territory. > A communist regime cannot feel secure so long as an example of another kind of life exists anywhere near it, with which its subjects can draw comparisons. It is for this reason that any form of Communism, not only the Soviet variety, is always at pains to shut itself off from the rest of the w…

I don't see how. Putin isn't a communist and Western media is widely available in Russia so there is no benefit in regards to information flow in expanding the border. And there is no significant economic difference between Russia and her neighbours, the Soviets were trying to hide the evidence that average people in the West had it better than the new Soviet man. Putin's actions look much more like those of the 19th…

Putin's administration justifies the current economic state and the rampant corruption in Russia by that Russia has is own 'special way' of development which is limited the history and the socio-economic heritage of the communist regime. If Ukraine(or any other ex-Soviet country) manages to get rid of the current cleptocratic system and launches succesfull socio-economic reforms that tackle corruption, it will be a strong signal to the broad russian population that the current regime is not the driver, but a hindrance to the overall development. That is why any regime change in ex-Ussr countries is viewed by suspicion or even open hostility by the elites in Russia.
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