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Reverse engineering Claude Code

kirshatrov.com

1–10 of 25 posts

Re: Reverse engineering Claude Code

#2
It is an interesting read. I can imagine a future where the "tools" we make available become numerous enough and poorly thought out enough that an AI could actually figure out how to escalate privileges and execute stuff outside the defined security boundaries by combining them.

It isn't hard to think of a simple example in which Claude.md can be written to by the LLM to allow accessing endpoints not whitelisted by the user by smuggling a base64 encoded payload that then gets decoded by a subroutine it wrote to a file without you noticing. Or realizing it can't use the WebFetchTool but it can write a script to do manual DNS resolution and then use bash TCP sockets instead of curl in case it is hardened to not be able to use curl.

Re: Reverse engineering Claude Code

#4
post #2

It is an interesting read. I can imagine a future where the "tools" we make available become numerous enough and poorly thought out enough that an AI could actually figure out how to escalate privileges and execute stuff outside the defined security boundaries by combining them. It isn't hard to think of a simple example in which Claude.md can be written to by the LLM to allow accessing endpoints not whitelisted by t…

I see this behavior all the time. When it can’t read a file using its read tool - it escalates up to try with bash. Often it tries to search the entire file system “find / …”

Re: Reverse engineering Claude Code

#5
post #2

It is an interesting read. I can imagine a future where the "tools" we make available become numerous enough and poorly thought out enough that an AI could actually figure out how to escalate privileges and execute stuff outside the defined security boundaries by combining them. It isn't hard to think of a simple example in which Claude.md can be written to by the LLM to allow accessing endpoints not whitelisted by t…

Cursor has basically run into this exact thing. It figured out it can read .env files by running other tools despite the file being "blocked": https://github.com/getcursor/cursor/issues/2546

Re: Reverse engineering Claude Code

#6
An interesting thing about the “agent” (it’s called Task inside Claude Code) is it starts a completely new Claude chat, with its own context etc. I’ve seen a Task go write its own code in multiple files and then your “main” chat ends up confused about what happened.

It also responds to the Task summary like you typed the message sometimes, like “That’s a fascinating analysis!” so kind of quirky.

Re: Reverse engineering Claude Code

#7
post #2

It is an interesting read. I can imagine a future where the "tools" we make available become numerous enough and poorly thought out enough that an AI could actually figure out how to escalate privileges and execute stuff outside the defined security boundaries by combining them. It isn't hard to think of a simple example in which Claude.md can be written to by the LLM to allow accessing endpoints not whitelisted by t…

XKCD 416: Zealous Autoconfig https://xkcd.com/416/

Re: Reverse engineering Claude Code

#8
post #2

It is an interesting read. I can imagine a future where the "tools" we make available become numerous enough and poorly thought out enough that an AI could actually figure out how to escalate privileges and execute stuff outside the defined security boundaries by combining them. It isn't hard to think of a simple example in which Claude.md can be written to by the LLM to allow accessing endpoints not whitelisted by t…

XKCD 416: Zealous Autoconfig https://xkcd.com/416/

It's missing one last panel where he is under his bed googling for lawyers specialized on kidnapping and CFAA charges

Re: Reverse engineering Claude Code

#9
post #2

It is an interesting read. I can imagine a future where the "tools" we make available become numerous enough and poorly thought out enough that an AI could actually figure out how to escalate privileges and execute stuff outside the defined security boundaries by combining them. It isn't hard to think of a simple example in which Claude.md can be written to by the LLM to allow accessing endpoints not whitelisted by t…

I see this behavior all the time. When it can’t read a file using its read tool - it escalates up to try with bash. Often it tries to search the entire file system “find / …”

I always tell agents to use ripgrep instead of find.
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