My vote on voting systems
blog.danielh.cc
My vote on voting systems
1–10 of 52 posts
Re: My vote on voting systems
#2- Schulze Method [0]
- Ranked Pairs [1]
The Schulze method allows for a simple ranked choice ballot, and satisfies more criteria than other RCV methods. Downside is that it is hecking complicated so it can feel like an opaque process. With distrustful electors it's a no go imo.
The Ranked Pairs method satisfies a similar number of criteria as Schulze, and meets a weaker version of later-no-harm. It's also a very intuitive method. The main downside is that the ballots become impossibly long, scaling quadratically with the number of candidates.
Re: My vote on voting systems
#3No voting method meets every criterion but two of my favourites are - Schulze Method [0] - Ranked Pairs [1] The Schulze method allows for a simple ranked choice ballot, and satisfies more criteria than other RCV methods. Downside is that it is hecking complicated so it can feel like an opaque process. With distrustful electors it's a no go imo. The Ranked Pairs method satisfies a similar number of criteria as Schulze…
Re: My vote on voting systems
#4Re: My vote on voting systems
#5No voting method meets every criterion but two of my favourites are - Schulze Method [0] - Ranked Pairs [1] The Schulze method allows for a simple ranked choice ballot, and satisfies more criteria than other RCV methods. Downside is that it is hecking complicated so it can feel like an opaque process. With distrustful electors it's a no go imo. The Ranked Pairs method satisfies a similar number of criteria as Schulze…
Ranked pairs does not have a quadratic ballot length, since all of the preference information can be computed from a single ranking of the candidates.
EDIT: I was also swapped "later-no-harm" with "independence of irrelevant alternatives". I should stop writing comments before my morning coffee.
Re: My vote on voting systems
#6Re: My vote on voting systems
#7It's weird to me how little score/approval voting has caught on (at least here in the US) amid the push to replace FPTP. It's a lot simpler to explain than RCV, and has a lot fewer downsides overall than both RCV and FPTP.
Re: My vote on voting systems
#8It's weird to me how little score/approval voting has caught on (at least here in the US) amid the push to replace FPTP. It's a lot simpler to explain than RCV, and has a lot fewer downsides overall than both RCV and FPTP.
As the article mentions, in the real world score voting would just be approval voting where you put a max score on some choices and 0 on others.
And in approval voting you need to think about how others will vote and pick your cutoff point based on who you think has a chance - do you vote "yes" for the center-right party to avoid the hard right party getting in? Or do you vote "no" to help the center-left party beat the center-right party? (swap those directions to personal preference)
RCV isn't perfect, but in all but the smallest elections there's really no practical strategic voting considerations. You just state your true preference order.
Of course, I'll take any of them over FPTP.
Re: My vote on voting systems
#9It's weird to me how little score/approval voting has caught on (at least here in the US) amid the push to replace FPTP. It's a lot simpler to explain than RCV, and has a lot fewer downsides overall than both RCV and FPTP.
Approval voting might be good but just at a human level, I think it can leave the voter feeling unsatisfied. If there is one candidate that I really like and another that I could only accept reluctantly as an alternative to someone worse then it feels bad that I need to "approve" of those two equally.
Re: My vote on voting systems
#10It's weird to me how little score/approval voting has caught on (at least here in the US) amid the push to replace FPTP. It's a lot simpler to explain than RCV, and has a lot fewer downsides overall than both RCV and FPTP.
Being vulnerable to strategic voting is a huge downside that outweighs other considerations. As the article mentions, in the real world score voting would just be approval voting where you put a max score on some choices and 0 on others. And in approval voting you need to think about how others will vote and pick your cutoff point based on who you think has a chance - do you vote "yes" for the center-right party to a…
I disagree that strategic voting as a downside outweighs the downsides of RCV or FPTP - especially when FPTP itself is susceptible to strategic voting, too. None of the three satisfy the condorcet winner criterion (that is: none of them guarantee the winner would beat every other candidate head-to-head), but it seems less likely / more contrived for score/approval voting to fail it.
> And in approval voting you need to think about how others will vote and pick your cutoff point based on who you think has a chance - do you vote "yes" for the center-right party to avoid the hard right party getting in? Or do you vote "no" to help the center-left party beat the center-right party? (swap those directions to personal preference)
That's why I'd personally go with a simple three-level score vote: "yeah", "meh", or "nah". If people really want to shoot themselves in the foot by ignoring the "meh" option, then so be it, but at least the option is there for people to vote "meh" for candidates that are merely acceptable/tolerable (and reserve "yeah" for ideal candidates and "nah" for unacceptable/intolerable candidates).